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Strategic Insights is a quarterly online journal published by the Center on Contemporary 
Conflict, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. 
 
We publish scholarly articles as well as viewpoints that address issues of current interest to 
the makers and executors of US national security policy. We are particularly interested in 
articles addressing homeland security, WMD/WME proliferation, regional conflict, and the 
contemporary role of US security forces. The journal seeks articles that will make our readers 
think, generate discussion, and gain new insight into the challenges and opportunities 
confronting US policymakers and military operators. Views that run counter to the 
conventional wisdom or official US government policy are welcomed. 
 
You can contact the editors at ccc@nps.edu. 
 
 










About the Cover 
 
The cover on this edition of Strategic Insights features part of a map designed in December 
2010 by Paul Butler, an intern on Facebook’s data infrastructure engineering team. Mr. 
Butler sampled ten million pairs of friends from Facebook and plotted lines based on the 
distance between their locations. The more friendships between a pair of cities, the brighter 
the lines. The end result is not data plotted across a map—rather, the map is made from the data 
itself. Based only on the online relationships between people, this map shows the outlines of 
continents and even some international boundaries, offering a glimpse of how international 
relations unfold both in cyberspace and physical reality. 
 





“As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of 
warfare…it has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space.” These 
words, written by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn last fall in Foreign Affairs, cemented the 
status of cyberspace as a domain of warfare like all others, and coincided nicely with US Cyber 
Command reaching its full operational capacity. Yet, suggestions of a strategy in the pages of this 
article and subsequent publications from Cyber Command and its four-star commander, Keith 
Alexander, belie the fundamental fact that the United States military, government, private sector, and 
citizenry are all seriously vulnerable to cyber attack and that we have no coherent plan to protect 
America. “Active defense,” by which Cyber Command means going offensive first, is not a strategy 
that will protect this nation. If anything is clear, it is that we have a remarkably well-developed 
offensive capability, but no commensurately serious commitment to defense. There is neither a plan 
nor any capability to defend America’s civilian infrastructure, from banking to telecoms to aviation. 
Perhaps the most important thing Americans can do to make us safer from cyber war is to discuss it, 
openly, in academic journals, to debate aspects of cyber war in Congress, and to educate the public 
and the world through mass media. Thus, this volume by the Naval Postgraduate School is an 
important step in improving our security as a nation.  
Given the central importance of net-centric warfare to our current military doctrine, I fear that this 
lack of clear thinking with regards to defense in cyberspace leaves not only our military, but our 
society as a whole, highly vulnerable to cyber attack. It will not be the first time that initial adopters 
of a new military technology, overcome with inertia or overconfident in the weapons they love and 
consider supreme, fail to defend effectively against that which they have just created. Thus it was 
that while American Colonel Billy Mitchell was the first to recognize the capability of small aircraft 
to destroy battleships, it was the Japanese Imperial Navy that most effectively harnessed this 
knowledge and nearly defeated the Americans in the Pacific during World War II. Great Britain 
invented the modern tank and a French Colonel, Charles de Gaulle, developed the first tactics of 
rapid attack with massed tanks supported by air and artillery. However, it was the Germans that 
perfected the tank design during the interwar period and employed de Gaulle’s tactics with horrific 
efficiency in what they referred to as blitzkrieg. I fear that we may be on the precipice of a similar 
situation in cyber war, one that may leave the American military hamstrung and the US civilian 
infrastructure shredded. 
Unlike the conventional examples from history, however, the threat to the United States in 
cyberspace will very likely not come from an adversary developing superior offensive capabilities. 
Rather it will be from one who can most effectively exploit the inherently asymmetrical nature of 
cyber war. While the notion of asymmetry in warfare is as old as the profession itself, its implications 
have rarely been so great as they are when placed in the context of cyber. To confront the United 
States military in conventional terms is a losing proposition; no other military today can surpass its 
capabilities on a tactical or strategic level. Yet, the conventional supremacy of the Americans is 
predicated upon a highly vulnerable foundation, its complete reliance upon information technology. 
Computers and networks enable all elements of the defense apparatus to function. From units in the 
field to procurement officers to strategic planners, all communications pass through various 
computer networks. Navigational and weapons systems aboard planes and ships depend on highly 
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sophisticated networked hardware and software, to say nothing of the thousands of satellites that 
provide imagery of nearly every inch of the earth. While this high degree of networking has brought 
unprecedented levels of productivity and efficiency, they also expose the entire operation to serious 
vulnerabilities. From the insider threat, as demonstrated by the WikiLeaks incidents, to the attacks 
that compromised the classified SIPRNet, to the hacking of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ 
personal computer, the examples of the vulnerabilities in cyberspace to our military abound. For this 
simple reason, the single most effective way to prevent units from communicating, procurements 
from taking place, or F-16s from properly acquiring targets, is to compromise chips and software in 
order to attack the network infrastructure and advanced weaponry of the net-centric giant. 
Nevertheless, for all of the potentially devastating implications for the United States military in a 
cyber war, such a war is probably not imminent. What ought to be of far greater importance not 
only to the United States, but to all industrialized nations, are the consequences of the current 
pandemic of economic cyber espionage. Economic warfare, which takes the shape of espionage 
conducted on an industrial scale against private corporations in all sectors across the globe, is 
happening every day. Intellectual property, proprietary information, bid and financial data – anything 
that comprises competitive knowledge in the digital global economy – is a potential target. The risks 
associated with such large-scale intellectual property theft pose an existential threat to the 
foundations of a state’s economic leadership, competitiveness, and well-being. In our inter-
connected world mutual dependencies among states abound, and thus, it would be in the long-term 
interest of few states to seek conventional war that could easily disrupt the delicate architecture of 
the global village. However, as the global competition for economic primacy intensifies in a 
knowledge-based global competition, the value of intellectual property, from research and 
development to biotech formulas to engineering designs, will only increase. China, among other 
nations, is systematically stealing terabytes of data at low cost, financially and diplomatically, and 
passing that data to its own companies. Private firms, limited by finite resources and obligations to 
maximize profits, will always lose against state-backed hackers unbound by such concerns. 
Governments, in the interest of maintaining economic stability, must therefore protect private 
industry and start the process of establishing an arms control regime in cyberspace. 
Arms control for cyber war is too often summarily dismissed with the question of attribution. Critics 
assert that if you cannot definitively determine who committed an attack, you cannot hold anyone 
accountable for violating an agreement. Definitely establishing the origin of cyber attacks is 
extremely difficult post facto, and in nearly all cases one only ends up with an educated guess. What 
the argument essentially says is that arms control in cyber war cannot work because it would be too 
hard to establish. This is a refrain that I encountered multiple times over the course of my career at 
the Pentagon, State Department, and White House. Whether it was conventional force reduction in 
Europe, nuclear weapons limitation and reduction with the Soviets, or international agreements on 
chemical and biological weapons, the initial reaction invoked, without fail, the “it’s too hard” 
argument. Yet we did, after long negotiations, draw down troop levels in Europe, and limit and 
reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in our arsenal and ban chemical and biological weapons. 
With persistence, there are solutions. A way around the attribution problem may be to include in an 
international agreement on cyber arms control an Obligation to Assist clause. Such a clause would 
require states party to share information on attacks as they were taking place, and would require that 
states cut off computers engaged in malicious activity, as confirmed by other parties and an 
international monitor. Such a convention obviates the attribution issue. The responsibility for 
malicious traffic rests with the state in which the malicious traffic originates, regardless of whether 
the actual attacker is located within its borders. I concede that this proposition is not perfect, but it 
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is perhaps the basis of a discussion that must begin now, because the risks are too grave and despite 
the associated difficulties, there is a great potential for good. 
Given the gravity of the implications of activities in this new domain of war fighting, it is vital that 
our national strategy be comprehensive, serious, and reflective of an open and frank debate, not just 
within the corridors of the Pentagon, but with academia and the broader public. Though the new 
Defense Department documents may suggest otherwise, “active defense” and “going first” do not 
constitute such a strategy. Again, I find myself reminded of historical precedent. In the early days of 
nuclear strategy, the Pentagon refused to share information regarding policies governing the use of 
nuclear weapons with anyone, let alone university professors. Yet as it became clear that the 
military’s plan to strike first with the entire nuclear arsenal was not an optimal strategy, civilian 
officials began to see the value of having academics like Bill Kauffman and Herman Khan dissect 
and analyze this all too important topic. Those whom Fred Kaplan has called “wizards of 
Armageddon” brought a much-needed critical eye to the nuclear strategy debate, and slowly backed 
the nation away from the dangers of a policy governed by a hair trigger. We need a similar debate 
today regarding cyber war. Should the US government keep secret its knowledge about software 
vulnerabilities that put the US economic infrastructure at risk? We do not know can who initiate 
cyber operations against a foreign entity, nor do we know how we would respond if we were the 
victims of a cyber attack. At what point would we respond kinetically? When does the response 
require presidential approval? These are but a small fraction of the number of critical, yet 
unanswered, questions about the national cyber strategy that need to be addressed. Fortunately, this 
journal and others like it are beginning to explore precisely these kinds of questions and analyze the 
issues associated with cyber war, work that will undoubtedly ultimately contribute to making us all 
safer. 
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 Beyond the Rift in Cyber Strategy 




Over the last five years, interest in cyber-defense has grown in earnest, particularly after the 
cyberattacks against the Estonian government in spring of  2007, the discovery of  the GhostNet 
network targeting the Dali Lama’s diplomatic offices in 2009, and the Stuxnet worm’s disruption of  
the Iranian nuclear program in 2010. As a result, the US government has made substantial moves in 
the last two years towards the institutionalization of  cyber-defense:  
• The appointment of  Howard Schmidt as Cybersecurity Coordinator for the Obama 
Administration in December 2009;  
 
• The implementation of  a formal partnership in October 2010 between the Department of  
Homeland Security and the Department of  Defense, which specifies the responsibilities of  each 
organization; 
 
• Finally, the creation of  the US Cyber Command in May 2010, a joint organization including 
components from all military services (the Army Forces Cyber Command, the U.S. Navy Fleet 
Cyber Command, the 24th Air Force, the Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command). 
Despite these bureaucratic efforts in the White House and in the interagency process, this article 
argues that there remains a lack of  consensus in Washington, particularly within the Department of  
Defense, on threat assessment in cyberspace and its military implications. A stark intellectual rift 
between “alarmists” and “skeptics” still prevails. As a result, this elementary battle has led to 
dysfunction in the institutional response to cyber-threats and jeopardizes the implementation of  an 
effective military posture in cyberspace. Consequently, we need to reassess the relevance of  
cyberspace as a distinct military domain. 
To that end, this article aims for a middle ground between these opposing views, supporting the idea 
that cyberattacks are more than just a technical nuisance, but less than an existential threat to US 
national security. As of  today, they remain a valuable, but not decisive, tool of  military action. At the 
operational level, it means that cyberspace is not an independent domain. In other words, while 
warfare in the air is different from warfare on the sea, it is possible to have one without the other. 
But warfare in cyberspace must be accompanied by warfare in one of  these other domains to lead to 
physical effects. As a result, this paper recommends a comprehensive integration of  cyberattacks 
(which are precisely not autonomous cyberwarfare) into a joint analysis of  military battles. Because 
pundits have been focusing on the broad geopolitical implications of  cyberattacks, the strategic 
literature lacks a systematic and detailed campaign analysis of  these acts. This joint analysis would 
frame cyberattacks as offensive or defensive military engagements in the process of  a larger naval, 
air, or land campaign. Based on the findings of  this research, cyberattacks should be considered a 
subset of  an offensive, a means of  denial rather than a means of  punishment. They aim at attaining an 
intermediate goal for the attacker.   
Consequently, as long as cyber operations are launched by actors with broader objectives than 
Strategic Insights • Spring 2011 Volume 10, Issue 1 4
 exclusively dominating channels of  communication, there is legitimate doubt over whether a 
cyberwar could occur without an extension to other traditional military domains.  
As a necessary word of  caution, this article explicitly excludes cases of  cyber-espionage whose aim 
differs from cyberattacks: while the former tries to steal and exploit information from an enemy (eg, 
the daily attempts of  intrusion into the servers of  the Defense Department), the latter are defined 
here in strict military terms to directly or indirectly destroy or disrupt targeted infrastructures. In 
other words, cyberattacks should be narrowly considered at the battle level as a component of  the 
forces used by the attacker. 
This article has three sections. The first section assesses the fundamental divide of  the strategic 
debate on cyber-defense. I show that although many efforts have been dedicated to understanding 
the strategic dimensions of  cyberspace, a rift prevails between two camps: one predicts the 
emergence of  cyberwarfare while the other characterizes such events as no more than cases of  
‘cyber-annoyance’. In the second section, I explain that this protracted clash of  views comes mainly 
from the use of  two misleading analogies for cyberwarfare: nuclear warfare and strategic bombing. 
The article then demonstrates in a third section that a middle way to implement a military policy in 
cyberspace can be found by understanding cyberattacks as a subset of  broader military operations. 
To that end, I employ the tools of  campaign analysis to make an appraisal of  events such as the 
cyberattacks against Georgia prior to its August 2008 war against Russia. Finally the article’s 
conclusion explores the implications of  my findings for future research. 
 
Cyberwar or cyber-annoyance? The fundamental divide of  the strategic debate 
In spite of  obvious efforts (such as the 2009 60-day Cyberspace Policy Review, led by Melissa Hathaway, 
former Senior Advisor to the US Director of  National Intelligence), the Obama administration has 
not tackled the fundamental dispute over the strategic implications of  cyberattacks. Currently in 
Washington, two opposing views compete with each other: the alarmist voices (and indeed the most 
vocal ones) who predict the advent of  cyberwarfare as a revolutionary form of  conflict, and the 
skeptical voices who acknowledge the “annoying” vulnerabilities of  US civilian and military 
infrastructures but who do not see such attacks as the constituents of  a pattern for potential new 
major conflicts. 
This divide has existed since the middle of  the 1990s, when the US Department of  Defense and 
military-related think tanks started issuing reports and articles on the strategic implications of  
cyberspace. Although the cyber realm and information warfare have significantly evolved since then, 
the terms of  the divide have been noticeably constant all along. Starting in the 1990s, an impressive 
proportion of  the strategic studies literature focused on the so-called “Revolution in Military 
Affairs”, of  which the optimal exploitation of  electronic interfaces was only one of  many 
components. From the futurists Alvin and Heidi Toeffler, and their famous “third wave” 
characterization of  the information revolution,1 to the iconoclast colonel Richard Szafranski and his 
fuzzy concept of  “neocortical warfare”, people inside the Defense Department started to read and 
write about warfare in the information age.2 This led to the now famous but still-ambiguous concept 
known as “information warfare”.3 
The starting point for emerging conceptual debates could be marked in 1993, when John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt, two researchers at the RAND Corporation, published an article titled 
“Cyberwar is Coming!” in the journal Comparative Strategy.4 Behind this emblematic title, the two 
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 scholars argued that cyberwar - defined as a war centered on information flowing through electronic 
interfaces - was to provoke a fundamental bottom-up review of  military organizations.  
Yet straight away, ideas about a war in cyberspace sounded at best farfetched, at worst spurious. 
After all, was it not a term - cyberspace - taken from a science fiction book?5 Some researchers saw 
this conflation of  concepts and ideas as an eventual march toward the establishment of  a coherent 
field of  studies. For instance, the late Laurent Murawiec, a scholar from the Hudson Institute, 
observed in 2001 that  
As presently constituted, the field seems to cover a bewildering array of  subsets: 
psychological warfare, deception, cyberwar, critical information protection, computer 
network attack, computer network exploitation, netwar, and more. The confusion is normal. 
When people started building automobiles, hundreds, if  not thousands of  attempts were 
made which bore the name of  “automobile”, and other names too. The variety of  shapes, 
methods, materials, solutions proposed to the various problems of  a self-propelled vehicle, 
was equally bewildering. It took time and experience, much competition and failures, to 
winnow, to rationalize, to weed out. We can only expect the same to hold true in the field of  
“information warfare” as opened up by the digital revolution of  the last quarter century.6  
But contrary to Murawiec's faith, ten years later, the confusion still remains. Moreover, this decade-
long divide has deepened since 2007 as cyber-defense has been put at the forefront of  the political-
military agenda following the cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, the use of  cyberspace during the 
military campaign between Russia and Georgia in 2008, and lastly the Stuxnet worm that targeted 
the Iranian nuclear plant in Natanz in 2010. 
Counted among the alarmist voices are recently retired US officials such as Richard Clarke, former 
Special Advisor to the President on Cybersecurity, and Mike McConnell, former Director for 
National Intelligence. Mr. Clarke explains in his book, Cyberwar: The Next Threat to National Security 
and What to Do About It, that what states “are capable of  doing in a cyber war could devastate a 
modern nation”.7 In February 2010, Mr. McConnell explicitly titled a much-discussed op-ed from 
the Washington Post, “How to win the cyberwar we're losing”.8  
More specifically, these voices frequently compare the current debate on the scope of  cyberwarfare 
with the age of  nuclear strategy in the 1950s. For instance, Mr. McConnell asserts that “the cyber-
war mirrors the nuclear challenge in terms of  the potential economic and psychological effects”.9 
Following this comparison, they call for a doctrine of  cyber-deterrence. Moreover, General Kevin 
Chilton, the head of  US Strategic Command, supports the idea of  a combined deterrence based on 
nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and cyberwarfare capabilities.  
In a US Air Force journal, Chilton wrote that “the deterrence impacts of  such uncertainty over the 
potential impacts of  a cyberspace attack would be a function of  the nature of  the attacker's goals 
and objectives. A competitor's concerns about unintended consequences could enhance the effects 
of  our deterrence activities if  it wishes to control escalation or fears blowback from its cyberspace 
operations”.10 This fairly resembles the Cold War's MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) doctrine. 
Originally emerging at the end of  the Kennedy administration, MAD was a doctrine that assured 
that a full-scale use of  nuclear weapons by two opposing sides would effectively result in the 
destruction of  both the attacker and the defender.11 Can such an argument be replicated into 
cyberspace? So far, it is hardly conceivable.  
As a matter of  fact, one year prior to Chilton's article, a suggestion from a US military officer was 
already raising similar questions. In May 2008, Colonel Charles Williamson from the US Air Force 
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 wrote a widely criticized article in the Armed Forces Journal on the potential build-up of  military 
botnets that could be used for offensive purposes.12 For Williamson,  
America needs a network that can project power by building an af.mil robot network 
(botnet) that can direct such massive amounts of  traffic to target computers that they can no 
longer communicate and become no more useful to our adversaries than hunks of  metal and 
plastic. America needs the ability to carpet bomb in cyberspace to create the deterrent we 
lack.13 
In other words, Williamson was not only acknowledging an on-going arms race in cyberspace, he 
was advocating it. But Williamson was only adding another argument to the idea that cyberspace in 
itself  is a new and separate domain of  warfare. This idea had grown in earnest several months 
before his article, when Estonia experienced cyberattacks against its governmental servers. Following 
the attacks, the US Secretary of  the Air Force, Michael Wynne, stated that “Russia, our Cold War 
nemesis, seems to have been the first to engage in cyber warfare”.14 Jaak Aaviksoo, Estonian Minister 
of  Defense, went further, evoking “the first unnoticed third world war”.15  
But even while these voices are urging for a new posture toward cyberwarfare, skeptical voices—
among them Howard Schmidt, the current Cybersecurity Coordinator for the Obama 
Administration—are  vigorously opposing their conclusions. Although such thinkers recognize the 
need for improving information system security, they understand the concept of  cyberwarfare as 
deeply flawed. For instance, Schmidt stated during an interview at the RSA Security Conference in 
San Francisco in March 2010: “There is no cyberwar [...] I think that is a terrible metaphor and I 
think that is a terrible concept”.16 
All in all, both postures (the alarmist and the skeptical) fuel the debate in Washington, both in the 
government and in think tanks. This rift has two consequences: first, the US military still remains 
uncertain precisely what cyberwarfare, cyberconflict or, indeed, any other term given to describe the 
political use of  attacks in the cyberspace actually stands for. Second, this tension logically affects the 
credibility of  the national security architecture, leading to official disagreements on the threat level 
(e.g. Howard Schmidt stating publicly that ‘there is no cyberwar’17) or even interservice rivalries (the 
Air Force having claimed since 2005 to be the one to ‘fly and fight in cyberspace’18). But the rift 
between these two antagonistic views can and should be overcome. This is the aim of  the next two 
sections, starting with how the confusion is produced by two analogies—nuclear warfare and 
strategic bombing—that too often frame the debate on cyber military policies. 
 
The problems of  current analogies for cyberwarfare 
Balancing the equation between the alarmists and the skeptics of  cyber-threats requires a critical 
examination of  the terms of  the debate, and more specifically of  the frequently used analogies. The 
study of  new phenomena in international affairs is often dependent on analogical reasoning. 
Analogies provide guideposts on the assumption that new issues can be understood within the 
framework of  older, more familiar ones. Regarding cyberspace, two analogies have been extensively 
used, both explicitly and implicitly: cyberwarfare as nuclear warfare, and cyberwarfare as strategic 
bombing. Each is misleading. 
The analogy with nuclear warfare is often used to emphasize the low level of  existing knowledge on 
the strategic implications of  cyberattacks. Within that logic, the same could be said of  the early 
nuclear literature published in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, no one denied the potentialities of  
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 nuclear weapons, as they were dramatically demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But equally, no 
one could accurately appraise how nuclear forces and their diffusion would alter the balance of  
power in the context of  the Cold War. It took years and some risky and bold analysis from Bernard 
Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter to build a more coherent understanding of  nuclear 
strategy.19 People needed to “think the unthinkable”, to cycle through numerous ideas and concepts 
in order to finally build a coherent intellectual framework for nuclear policy analysis.20  
The comparison with cyberwarfare, however, cannot be stretched further. While nuclear weapons 
remain the single most lethal asset available to armed forces, in terms of  military applications, 
cyberattacks do not have any direct lethal effect. In terms of  force employment, the cyberattacks 
perpetrated in recent years have tended to be used in support of  combined operations (the Russia-
Georgia war of  2008) with low-intensity effects, or to achieve a modest political outcome (the 
intimidation of  Estonia in 2007). By contrast, nuclear warfare—at least since the widespread 
acceptance of  the MAD doctrine—has been understood to carry the real risk of  escalation to a 
Clausewitzian absolute conflict that shifts the strategic calculus of  conventional warfare. Deterrence 
in the nuclear field is relevant because of  its absolute character. Cyberattacks can disrupt the 
command and control systems of  an enemy, but they do not annihilate his population. 
Furthermore, computer scientists underline that technical limitations prevent the victim of  a 
cyberattack from identifying their attacker in cyberspace, which results in an inability to deter a 
potentially anonymous aggressor. Indeed, with the current state of  technology, cyberattacks deny the 
technological possibility to trace their origins. The use of  botnets implies the hijacking of  computers 
that can be located in other countries, or even on other continents. Therefore, authorities do not 
have any certainty with which to attribute an attack to a terrorist organization or to a state. For 
instance, cyberattacks on Estonia in spring 2007 were partly originating from computers physically 
located in California. Therefore, for all these reasons, cyberattacks can barely be compared to 
nuclear strikes. 
The second analogy refers to strategic bombing, a theory of  coercion based on the exploitation of  
massive air attacks that emerged at the end of  the First World War and that has, for much of  the 
period since, constituted a dogma of  the US Air Force in its claims for the independent effectiveness 
of  airpower. As Caroline Ziemke wryly observed: “Strategic bombing is not mere doctrine to the 
USAF; it is its lifeblood and provides its entire raison d'être. Strategic bombing is as central to the 
identity of  the Air Force as the New Testament is to the Catholic Church”.21 In other words, the fact 
that strategic bombing is USAF's raison d'être demonstrates how the US armed forces can acquire 
technological obsessions as a product of  their strategic culture, even when the empirical evidence 
does not systematically support their position. 
The presumed similarity between cyberattacks and strategic bombing has already led several pundits 
to argue for an explicit cyberpower doctrine, recalling directly the long and intractable debate over 
the independent effects of  airpower.22 Institutionally, this analogy can be explained as a product of  
the US Air Force's sunk investment in cyberspace expertise. But more particularly, this analogy 
emphasizes the persistently technology-centered nature of  US strategic culture.23 
In other words, the analogy is based on the idea that technological capabilities (whether air strikes or 
cyberattacks) can compel the enemy to do our will without ever launching a massive and costly 
ground offensive.24 But in spite of  certain thinkers’ enduring faith, there is little evidence that 
strategic bombing has ever decisively determined victory in war.25 Regarding cyberattacks, there is 
even less proof  that they have been decisive in any military context.  
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 The best example of  this misleading analogy is the contemporary debate surrounding the Stuxnet 
attack against the Iranian uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz. After rumors spreading in the 
summer of  2010, the authorities in Tehran acknowledged in November that the control systems of  
its nuclear facilities had been targeted by a cyberattack that caused significant physical damage. There 
is clear evidence from the reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency that the 
cyberattacks targeting the centrifuges delayed for about a week Iran’s nuclear program. Nevertheless, 
Stuxnet did not decisively stop Tehran’s ambition, it only hindered the pace of  its fulfilment.26 Thus, 
the exaggerated statements on Stuxnet and the advent of  cyberwar per se come from this same belief  
about strategic bombing and its decisiveness. 
Consequently the analogy is not applicable, not strictly because cyberattacks lack the lethality of  air 
strikes (they actually could resemble air strikes in terms of  disruptive effects), but because the 
analogy is biased by the fundamental assumption that strategic bombing can be decisive and so 
cyberattacks could as well. 
Although the errors vary for the respective different comparisons with nuclear warfare or strategic 
bombing, one common conclusion can be drawn: as of  today, cyberattacks do not amount to a 
distinct field of  warfare with its own rules and processes. Both analogies should therefore be 
avoided if  we are to get the conceptual framework for the analysis of  cyberattacks right. Therefore, 
we need to strictly understand the history of  the phenomenon within the context of  military 
operations. 
 
A middle way for a military posture in cyberspace 
The political science literature dedicated to campaign analysis can provide precious insights on how 
to articulate a robust strategic analysis of  cyberattacks that avoids both the fads of  
“cyberwarmongers” and the reductionist arguments of  “cyberskepticals”. Campaign analysis looks 
at the operational level of  military activity by combining an appraisal of  the objectives, the military 
balance (quantity, quality, joint capabilities), the terrain, the duration of  the campaign and its 
evolution (breakthrough, maneuver).27 Going beyond a simple compilation of  military resources and 
technologies, this methodology allows us to get a better grasp of  how these assets are used during the 
campaign, what Stephen Biddle calls the “force employment” factor.28 
So far, campaign analysis has rarely looked at cyberattacks. The most obvious reason is the lack of  
sufficient available data (due to the classification issue) that would be needed. Nevertheless, based on 
the first lessons learned from the cyberattacks released to the public (mostly about the Estonian and 
the Georgian cases), cyberwarfare cannot be described as an independent field of  warfare. There 
cannot be war in cyberspace like there are instances of  wars in the air, on the seas, or on land. 
Cyberattacks can only be conceived as a component by-product of  a larger military campaign. In 
other words, a cyberconflict has to be defined as a proxy conflict aimed at attaining an intermediate 
goal for an attacker, thereby functioning as a subsidiary addition to conventional kinetic military 
operations. Cyberattacks are means of  denial, not of  punishment: they can block an enemy's ability 
to use its information systems as part of  their war effort, but they are rarely designed to achieve 
political outcomes in their own right by inflicting an unbearable cost on the defender.29 
On that matter, the lessons learned from the cybercampaign against Georgia during the war in 
Russia in August 2008 are instructive. Georgia experienced early cyberattacks in late July, including 
an attack on the presidential website on July 19. Due to a distributed denial of  service attack, the 
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 website remained unavailable for twenty-four hours.30 After a two week pause, cyberattacks targeting 
Georgian government and media websites started by late August 7 following President Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s decision to attack South Ossetian separatist forces that night. But the wave of  attacks 
substantially increased on August 8, the day the Russian armed forces entered Georgia, when 
cyberwarriors began to block and deny access to Georgian govermental websites, and moved on to 
expand the list of  targets to include financial institutions.31 
Experts from the US Cyber Consequences Unit (US CCCU) surmised that the attackers were 
civilians recruited through electronic social networks. However, more significantly, the authors of  
the report concluded that there was a clear convergence between the Russian armed forces' 
campaign and the hackers' actions: “The organizers of  the cyber attacks had advance notice of  
Russian military intentions, and they were tipped off  about the timing of  the Russian military 
operations while these operations were being carried out”.32 Consequently, this illustrative case of  
cyberwarfare clearly demonstrates the integration of  such practices into a larger military campaign. 
By themselves, cyberattacks function as proxy components of  a strategic offensive. Indeed, one 
could argue that the use of  cyberattacks during the conflict between Russia and Georgia pointed 
away from the use of  autonomous cyberwarfare in itself, and instead illustrated that there are 
combined operations that can exploit cyberattacks in the same way that theater air campaigns have 
been performed for decades.  
Interestingly, this also happens to be the way that Chinese strategists conceive the exploitation of  
cyberspace. In spite of  misleading speculations regarding Chinese capabilities (mainly a consequence 
of  the alarm generated by the best-selling book Unrestricted Warfare, written in 1999 by PLA colonels 
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui), the People's Liberation Army (PLA) does not conceive cyberspace 
as an autonomous military domain.33 Rather, the Chinese military has explicitly adopted a posture 
including the concept of  “integrated network electronic warfare”, which aims at controlling the flow 
of  information in the adversary's system and at maintaining the PLA's information superiority on a 
traditional, physical battlefield. Moreover, the seminal Chinese documents, The Science of  Military 
Strategy and The Science of  Campaigns, both underline the decisive role of  information superiority in air 
and sea warfare.34 Such strategic thought clearly integrates cyberattacks into classic military 
campaigns. In short, even thinkers in the United States' principal future great power rival only see 
cyber as a subcomponent of  modern conventional conflicts. 
In spite of  all the political exaggerations regarding cyberwarfare, modern cases (Estonia in 2007, 
Georgia in 2008, the revelations over a so-called 'GhostNet' operating against Tibetan authorities) 
display evidence that there are no truly independent or even autonomous cyberwars per se.35 In all of  
these instances, cyberattacks were a component by-product of  a larger campaign (political 
intimidation in the Estonian and Tibetan cases, military intervention in the Georgian case).  
As a result, our assessment renders debate on the future of  deterrence in cyberspace irrelevant. Of  
course, this does not mean that hackers cannot inflict significant damage that could severely disrupt 
the vital infrastructure of  a country but so too, still, could bombers and tanks. Even worst-case 
scenarios involving cyberattacks do not suggest that the United States or other major powers could 
be severely coerced, let alone existentially threatened, by such cyberattacks alone.  
The belief  that disruptions in cyberspace could defeat a country is flawed—and dangerous. The idea 
that cyberwarriors could become the principal combatants of  a future war without physical 
implications remains science fiction à la William Gibson. It might be the role of  strategic futurists to 
explore such narratives, but policy-makers that need to base analysis on present-day objective facts 
have to acknowledge this evidence: taking into account recent international events and known 
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 technological trends, cyberattacks cannot be compared to nuclear warfare. The actual analogy that 
should be explored, if  such analogical reasoning is cognitively necessary to conceptualize and 
understand the emergence of  cyberattacks, is electronic warfare. It may be less strategic and more 
technical, but it is also more relevant. 
◆ ◆ ◆ 
Policy-makers and military planners should neither overestimate the strategic scope nor 
underestimate the operational effectiveness of  cyberattacks. The protracted battle over their 
significance has not only intellectual implications but policy ones as well. The inability of  the Obama 
administration to bridge this decade-long gap between these two distinct views of  cyber-defense 
extends the institutional dysfunction into the current system. Alarmists and skeptics are dispersed in 
all levels of  the chain of  command (in the White House, the Department of  Homeland Security, the 
Department of  Defense, the National Security Agency or the Department of  State) without anyone 
prevailing. As a result, final decisions are still taken as a product of  bureaucratic tactics, rather than 
on the back of  cautious strategic threat-assessment.36 
Therefore, getting the strategic appraisal right should be the priority when designing the relevant 
military posture. As I explained in this article, there is a middle ground between dismissing the 
military significance of  cyberattacks and overestimating their reach. Cyberattacks certainly represent 
a cost-effective tool to support classic land, sea and air campaigns, and consequently their military 
added-value should be assessed in the context of  joint operations. But they do not represent a new 
and revolutionary class of  military operation in their own right. 
In the coming years, the challenge will be precisely to measure this added-value, whether in offense 
or in defense, and at both the national armed forces level and the joint international level. Policy 
makers and strategic analysts should then increase their efforts on the exploitation of  two techniques 
helpful to adapt a military posture in cyberspace: 
• First, thorough campaign analysis of  recent cyberattacks can provide precious assessments of  
the “force employment” factor in cyberspace and its effectiveness on the battlefield. It will 
permit the US military to shift its focus from cybertechnology as the decisive assets to a posture 
based on an optimal exploitation of  these weapons in the context of  combined operations to 
achieve strategic objectives; 
 
• Second, scenario-based exercises should look at how US armed forces can operate in a degraded 
cyber environment.37 Exploring specific contingencies where cyberattacks would disrupt the 
conduct of  an operation, these exercises should not only involve national servicemen but also 
the militaries from NATO members as well as from traditional allies (Japan, South Korea). This 
will provide new evidence and ideas on how to integrate these engagements as an additional 
contributory element to a broader military campaign.38  
This adaptation process could well represent the key to both defensive resilience and offensive edge 
when confronting future cyber-threats. 
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In June 2010, U.S. Senators Susan Collins, Joseph Lieberman, and Tom Carper introduced the 
Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act. One of  its many aims is to protect critical 
infrastructures in the United States from cyber attack. In January 2011, Brandon Milhorn, staff  
director of  the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, defended the bill, 
saying that it would prevent a hacker from opening the floodgates of  the Hoover Dam. Peter Soeth, 
a spokesman for the US Bureau of  Reclamation, the agency which manages the Hoover Dam, 
objected to that example, arguing that “These types of  facilities are protected by multiple layers of  
security, including physical separation from the internet, that are in place because of  multiple 
security mandates and good business practices.”1 
This dispute over the Hoover Dam demonstrates the classic pattern of  debate over critical 
infrastructures and their vulnerability to cyber attacks. Most of  the process control systems designed 
to manage critical infrastructures, such as electric grids, oil pipelines, and water utilities, use 
specialized hardware and proprietary protocols. However, since the 1990s, the managers of  these 
infrastructures have been integrating their control systems with computer networks built from 
commercial off-the-shelf  operating systems, such as Windows and Unix.2 This has simplified the 
task of  managing facilities remotely, but it has also made process control systems vulnerable to 
attack over the internet. Alarmists point to these connections as vulnerabilities that pose almost epic 
threats; skeptics immediately dismiss such fears, claiming that the necessary measures to prevent a 
catastrophic cyber attack have already been implemented. History suggests the truth lies somewhere 
in between. 
As a relatively young field, national cyber security policy has been open to speculation about 
potential threats. However, in 2011, network operators have accumulated enough experience and 
data from real world attacks to draw a more realistic picture of  the threats facing critical 
infrastructures. This paper will examine the history of  cyber security incidents at nuclear facilities to 
assess the extent to which recorded vulnerabilities pose an “epic” threat. Specifically, it will examine 
three cyber incidents that occurred at U.S. nuclear facilities between 2003 and 2008. It will then turn 
to details of  the 2010 Stuxnet attack against the Iranian nuclear program to outline similarities with 
the three U.S. incidents. The lessons from these four incidents suggest that situational awareness and 
other security measures are too weak in their current state to guarantee that a catastrophic attack will 
never happen. However, it will also argue that launching a catastrophic attack is not simple and 
requires a sophisticated adversary. The article will then turn to gaps in nuclear regulation that policy 
makers should consider when formulating cyber security policies, not only for nuclear facilities, but 
for other critical infrastructures. 
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 Figure 1: Highly simplified representation of  a process control network 
 
Process control systems 
Historically, critical infrastructures have used two kinds of  control systems: supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems that quickly gather remote field data, and distributed control 
systems (DCS) that manage automated manufacturing processes. Over time, these systems began to 
share many of  the same technologies and features, making them less distinct from each other. 
However, given their separate histories, much of  their distinct terminology remains. Other terms, 
such as integrated control systems (ICS) or instrumentation and control (I&C) are also used, 
depending on the traditional practice of  the facilities using these systems. This paper will collectively 
refer to these technologies as process control systems (PCS). 3 
Process control systems come in any number of  complex architectures, but a general pattern holds 
for most facilities. The control network is the collection of  computer systems which directly monitor 
and control plant operations. At the top are the human-machine interfaces (HMI) that display data from 
plant equipment and allow technicians to adjust their operations. These are often Windows or Unix 
based computers. HMI communicate over a control bus with other computers that monitor and 
control operations using software that is less user-friendly. These computers communicate over a 
field bus with programmable logic controllers (PLC), hardware that directly adjusts the various motors, 
sensors, actuators, and other physical components at the heart of  a plant's operations.4 This is a 
highly simplified description of  a control network; structure and terminology will vary. 
Power plants also have office networks for business purposes. The office networks often collect data 
from control networks and have connections with a wider corporate network over the internet. 
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Connecting control networks with business offices and the larger corporate network makes it easier 
for managers to match plant operations with business goals and improve efficiency. However, it also 
opens a path that malicious hackers on the wider internet could follow to the plant’s process control 
systems. 
 
Vulnerability of  process control systems 
Operators of  process control systems used to believe they were invulnerable to cyber attack for two 
main reasons. The first reason is the assumption that PCS are isolated from the internet; the second 
is that PCS generally use proprietary protocols and specialized hardware not compatible with 
ordinary computers and common network protocols like Ethernet and TCP/IP. These assumptions 
have led some PCS operators to see the threat of  a cyber attack as alarmist. For example, a 2002 
article published in CIO Magazine outlines the numerous security precautions taken by the 
Massachusetts Water Resource Authority (MWRA) and concludes that a cyber attack against its PCS 
would have no effect: 
[M]ost public utilities rely on a highly customized Scada system. No two are the 
same, so hacking them requires specific knowledge -- in this case, knowledge of  the 
MWRA's design and access to that customized software. ... Scada is not networked, 
except in two places. 5 
He added: 
[PLCs] follow the lowest level, most basic instructions (such as turn on and turn off), 
and report them to Scada ... If  something is wrong, the PLC says, "Help me" in the 
form of  an alarm. The alarm sounds at the water site and at the Scada operations 
centers. The alarm also flashes on the computers, and it can't be shut off  until a 
formal acknowledgement of  the alarm is made and physically logged by a human 
being6. 
However, many operators have been moving towards open protocols and off-the-shelf  hardware to 
manage their process control systems, even connecting them to the internet—sometimes 
inadvertently.7 These trends have made PCS vulnerable to hackers, often with dangerous results. 
This fact had been demonstrated even before the MWRA article and has been repeatedly confirmed 
by penetration testers hired to assess cyber security at critical infrastructures. At the 2006 Black Hat 
Conference, presenters from IBM Internet Security Systems' X-Force team outlined a penetration 
test at an unnamed power plant. While meeting with plant management in a conference room, the 
testing team found a unprotected wireless access point, used it to access the plant's business 
network, and from there accessed the plant's control network using a ten-year old exploit. In X-
Force's experience, only knowledge of  common internet protocols was necessary to interfere with 
PCS systems, but any hacker who wanted to take the extra step to learn about PCS protocols could 
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find technical specifications online.8 
Past PCS attacks have even caused physical damage to critical infrastructures. For example, in 2000 a 
former contractor hacked into the Maroochy Water District's PCS system in Queensland, Australia, 
and released 80,000 liters of  raw sewage into parks, rivers, and even the Hyatt Regency Hotel; the 
smell drove away local residents, river water turned black, and marine life died as a result.9 In March 
2007, Idaho National Laboratory conducted a test of  the so-called "Aurora vulnerability". This 
vulnerability would allow an attacker at a remote high voltage circuit breaker to physically destroy a 
generator by quickly opening and closing the breaker. Details of  this vulnerability have been 
designated "For Official Use Only" by the Department of  Homeland Security.10 
Cyber attacks against PCS, whether intentional or unintentional, are likely underreported. No 
regulation exists requiring power plants to report problems with or attacks against their control 
systems. In the case of  the Aurora vulnerability, ES-ISAC (Electric Sector Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center) and the Nuclear Energy Institute issued advisories that required no action.11 In 
April 2009, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) issued a letter stating that 
many power companies were choosing not to identify critical assets in order to avoid complying with 
cyber security standards, leaving them exposed to such vulnerabilities as Aurora.12 NERC explains 
this behavior as a misconception of  cyber threats; most operators do not see their own systems as 
critical to the Bulk Electric System, so they fail to realize that a cyber attack could affect multiple 
systems at once, and through them the power grid as a whole. In another case, an unnamed power 
plant suffered a targeted attack and lost process control systems for two weeks. However, since the 
attack did not disrupt power generation, the attack was not reported to government agencies.13 
 
Process control systems at nuclear power plants 
The United States has 104 nuclear power plants generating 98,000 megawatts of  electricity, roughly 
20% of  the electricity generated within the US. These plants generally have process control systems, 
often designed by the same companies that provide these systems to non-nuclear power plants.14 
However, the operators of  non-nuclear plants usually have better hardware and cyber security 
experience than their colleagues at nuclear facilities. Since installation and upgrades of  PCS are 
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13 Joe Weiss. "Control system cyber events, 60 Minutes, disclosure, and FUD", ControlGlobal.com Unfettered Blog 
(November 13, 2009).  
 http://community.controlglobal.com/content/control-system-cyber-events-60-minutes-disclosure-and-fud 
14 Ken Barnes, Briam Johnson, and Reva Nickelson. Review of  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition  (SCADA) Systems, 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, January 2004, page 9. 
Strategic Insights • Spring 2011 Volume 10, Issue 1 18
costly and time-consuming, most non-nuclear PCS operate for eight to fifteen years, the expected 
lifespan of  the hardware used. However, nuclear plants face even higher costs and more stringent 
safety requirements for their PCS, so they often choose to continue using their original control 
systems rather than upgrade. A nuclear PCS can be in service for twenty to thirty years, well past the 
life expectancy of  the hardware. Many plants are still using systems based on analog electronics 
rather than digital.15 This is confirmed by the experience of  nuclear engineer Joe Weiss, now a 
managing partner of  Applied Control Solutions, a consultancy specializing in control system cyber 
security. Mr. Weiss worked for five years managing a nuclear instrumentation program for the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). However, nuclear plants prefer to use tested technologies 
so Mr. Weiss did not get to do "bleeding edge" research until he managed EPRI's research program 
for fossil fuel plant instrumentation. This meant that nuclear plants had often adopted modern 
information technology for their process control systems, but had less experience implementing 
cyber security on those systems than their colleagues at other electric power plants. This experience 
gap often led nuclear operators to assume they were less exposed to cyber threats than non-nuclear 
power plants.16 
In the past five years, US government-funded research into the cyber security of  process control 
systems has focused mainly on oil and gas utilities and the electric grid. While nuclear power plants 
face many of  the same issues in protecting their infrastructure, the key difference is the nuclear 
reactor. Non-nuclear generators can be completely shutdown, but nuclear reactors run for one to 
two years once the fuel is installed. Even when the reactor is "shutdown", the fuel still produces 
decay heat and must be cooled, or the reactor core may melt. The partial meltdown of  Three-Mile 
Island Unit 2 occurred during a reactor shutdown due to operator errors and equipment 
malfunctions.17 If  such errors and malfunctions can be replicated by a cyber attack, then a reactor 
meltdown is possible. To determine the danger of  this threat, it is necessary to examine cyber 
incidents that have occurred at nuclear power plants. 
 
Davis-Besse worm infection 
On January 25, 2003, at 12:30 AM Eastern Standard Time, the Slammer worm began exploiting a 
vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server. Within ten minutes, it had infected 75,000 servers 
worldwide—90% of  vulnerable hosts. The design of  Slammer was simple; it did not write itself  to 
the hard drive, delete files, or obtain system control for its author. Instead, it settled in system 
memory and searched for other hosts to infect. Removing the worm was as simple as rebooting the 
server after closing network port 1434, Slammer's point of  entry. Installing a patch Microsoft had 
released six months earlier would eliminate the vulnerability Slammer exploited and prevent another 
infection. 
Although Slammer carried no malicious payload, it still caused considerable disruption. It searched 
for new hosts by scanning random IP addresses. This generated a huge volume of  spurious traffic, 
consuming bandwidth and clogging networks. Slammer’s random IP scans disabled data-entry 
terminals at a 911 call center in Bellevue, Washington (population 680,000), shutdown 13,000 Bank 
of  America ATMs, and forced Continental Airlines to cancel several flights when their online 
                                                
15 Ibid, page 23. 
16 Joe Weiss. "Nuclear plant cyber security has a ways to go", ControlGlobal.com Unfettered Blog, March 25, 2008. 
 http://community.controlglobal.com/content/nuclear-plant-cyber-security-has-ways-go 
17 Ronald L. Krutz. Securing SCADA Systems. (Indianapolis: Wiley Publishing, 2006), 29. 
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ticketing system and kiosks could not process orders.18 South Korea suffered a nationwide internet 
outage lasting half  a day.19 
The Slammer worm also infected computer systems at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant near 
Oak Harbor, Ohio. The worm traveled from a consultant's network, to the corporate network of  
First Energy Nuclear, the licensee for Davis-Besse, then to the process control network for the 
plant. The traffic generated by the worm clogged the corporate and control networks. For four 
hours and fifty minutes, plant personnel could not access the Safety Parameter Display System 
(SPDS), which shows sensitive data about the reactor core collected from coolant systems, 
temperature sensors, and radiation detectors—these components would be the first to indicate 
meltdown conditions. Power plants are required to notify the NRC if  an SPDS outage lasts longer 
than eight hours. 
The reactor at Davis-Besse had been offline for nearly a year before its Slammer infection due to the 
discovery of  a hole in the reactor head.20 Although Slammer's scanning traffic did block sensors 
from providing digital readouts to control systems, it did not affect analog readouts on the 
equipment itself; plant technicians could still get reliable data from sensors by physically walking up 
to them and looking at them, though this process is slower than retrieving data over a network. 
Davis-Besse had a firewall protecting its corporate network from the wider internet, and its 
configuration would have prevented a Slammer infection. However, a consultant had created a 
connection behind the firewall to the consultancy's office network. This allowed Slammer to bypass 
the firewall and infect First Energy's corporate network. From there, it faced no obstacle on its way 
to the plant control network. In response, First Energy set up a firewall between the corporate 
network and the plant control network. 
The Davis-Besse incident highlighted the fact that most nuclear power plants, by retrofitting their 
SCADA systems for remote monitoring from their corporate network, had unknowingly connected 
their control networks to the internet. At the time, the NRC did not permit remote operation of  
plant functions.21 That policy would change by 2008. 
 
Browns Ferry shutdown 
The August 19, 2006, shutdown of  Unit 3 at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant near Athens, Alabama, 
demonstrates that not just computers, but even critical reactor components, could be disrupted and 
disabled by a cyber attack. Unit 3 was manually shutdown after the failure of  both reactor 
recirculation pumps and the condensate demineralizer controller.22 Without the recirculation pumps, 
the power plant could not cool the reactor, making a shutdown necessary to avoid melting the 
reactor core. 
                                                
18 Robert O. Harrow, Jr. "Internet Worm Unearths New Holes", SecurityFocus (January 29, 2003), 
 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/2186 
19 Stacy Cowley and Martyn Williams. "Slammer Worm Slaps Net Down, But Not Out" PCWorld (January 25, 2003), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/108988/slammer_worm_slaps_net_down_but_not_out.html 
20 Kevin Poulsen. "Slammer worm crashed Ohio nuke plant network", SecurityFocus (August 19, 2003), 
 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767 
21 Ibid. 
22 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Effects of  Ethernet-based, non-safety related controls on the safe and 
continued operation of  nuclear power stations" NRC Information Notice (April 17, 2007). 
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The condensate demineralizer is a kind of  programmable logic controller (PLC); the recirculation 
pumps depend on variable frequency drives (VFD) to modulate motor speed. Both kinds of  devices 
have embedded microprocessors that can communicate data over Ethernet, a popular standard for 
local access networks (LAN). However, both devices are prone to failure in high traffic 
environments. A device using Ethernet broadcasts data packets to every other device connected to 
the network. Receiving devices must examine each packet to determine which ones are addressed to 
them and to ignore those that are not. It appears the Browns Ferry control network produced more 
traffic than the PLC and VFD controllers could handle; it is also possible that the PLC 
malfunctioned and flooded the Ethernet with spurious traffic, disabling the VFD controllers; tests 
conducted after the incident were inconclusive.  
The failure of  these controllers was not the result of  a cyber attack. However, it demonstrates the 
effect that one component can have on an entire PCS network and every device on that network. 
Combined with the Davis-Besse worm infection, the Browns Ferry shutdown presents a possible 
attack scenario. If  a worm like Slammer had infected the control network of  an active plant and 
attempted to spread not only through UDP, but also through Ethernet, it could have disabled the 
recirculation pumps as well as the sensors that would alert plant personnel to the problem.  
 
Hatch automatic shutdown 
Due to the growing network connections between control systems and office computers, even 
seemingly simple actions can have unexpected results. On March 7, 2008, Unit 2 of  the Hatch 
nuclear power plant near Baxley, Georgia, automatically shutdown after an engineer applied a 
software update to a single computer on the plant's business network. The computer was used to 
collect diagnostic data from the process control network; the update was designed to synchronize 
data on both networks. When the engineer rebooted the computer, the synchronization program 
reset the data on the control network. The control systems interpreted the reset as a sudden drop in 
the reactor's water reservoirs and initiated an automatic shutdown.23 
This innocent mistake demonstrates how malicious hackers could make simple changes to a business 
network that end up affecting a nuclear reactor—even if  they have no intent to interfere with critical 
systems. This incident is probably the least critical of  those examined so far, since it activated safety 
systems rather than disrupting them. However, it also demonstrates that plant operators do not fully 
understand the dependencies between network devices. This would make it difficult to identify and 
protect all the vulnerabilities in a process control system. 
 
Stuxnet: a proof  of  concept 
The Stuxnet attack against the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates the impact that a sophisticated 
adversary with a detailed knowledge of  process control systems can have on critical infrastructures. 
Stuxnet is believed to have destroyed 984 centrifuges at Iran’s uranium enrichment facility in 
Natanz.24 An analysis of  the event by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 
                                                
23 Brain Krebs, "Cyber Incident Blamed for Nuclear Power Plant Shutdown" Washington Post, June 5, 2008. 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/05/AR2008060501958.html 
24  William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iranian Nuclear 
Delay”. New York Times, January 15, 2011. 
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based on open source technical data about the Stuxnet computer worm and the Iranian nuclear 
program, found that Stuxnet may have been designed specifically for that purpose. However, 
Stuxnet also demonstrates the limitations that even such a sophisticated adversary would face in 
launching an attack against process control systems. The ISIS report finds that the Stuxnet attack, 
though it successfully disrupted the Iranian centrifuge program, did not slow down Iran’s 
accumulation of  low-enriched uranium.25 The attack is remarkable for its sophistication, but it did 
not pose an epic threat to Iran. 
However, that sophistication must be considered when assessing the vulnerability of  nuclear 
facilities to cyber attack. The Stuxnet worm targeted specific PCS components used in the Iranian 
centrifuge cascades: a frequency converter manufactured by Iranian firm Fararo Paya, another 
frequency converter manufactured by Finland’s Vacon,26 and the S7-315 and S7-417 programmable 
logic controllers made by Siemens.27 The PLCs controlled the frequency converters to modulate the 
speed at which the centrifuges spun. Stuxnet commanded the PLCs to speed up and slow down the 
spinning centrifuges, destroying some of  them, while sending false data to plant operators to make it 
appear the centrifuges were behaving normally. The New York Times report suggests that Stuxnet’s 
authors may have learned about vulnerabilities in the Siemens controllers thanks to a partnership 
between Siemens and the Idaho National Laboratory aimed at assessing vulnerabilities in such 
components. These products are general PCS components not unique to the Iranian nuclear 
program; Siemens reports that at least 24 of  its customers were infected by Stuxnet, though they 
suffered no damage.28 
The reason Stuxnet did not disrupt every vulnerable PCS it infected is that it was programmed to 
disrupt only systems that had the same configuration as the centrifuge cascade used at Natanz.29 
Antivirus company Symantec began detecting Stuxnet traffic in June 2009, mostly in Iran, but also in 
neighboring countries. However, since it did not spread aggressively and did not damage the systems 
it had infected, it raised little alarm.30 Only at the Natanz enrichment facility did it have a major 
effect. Experts cited by the New York Times report suggest that Israeli intelligence provided the 
specific technical details necessary for Stuxnet to limit its damage to the Iranian nuclear program. 
While the New York Times article only presents a possible scenario, that scenario and the evidence 
reflect the challenges of  executing a catastrophic cyber attack against a nuclear facility. Programming 
is a cyclical process of  trial and error. For an amateur hacker working only with a computer, the 
costs of  testing software are trivial. Testing software designed for process control systems, however, 
requires access to the system in question, which is usually expensive. Malicious hackers could run 
tests on a remote PCS they had compromised, but an unsuccessful test could raise alarms or damage 
the system before the hackers were ready for the next stage of  an attack. The Stuxnet authors would 
need a dedicated testbed to refine their code. Stuxnet also incorporated technical information 
specific to the Iranian facility. These resources are out of  the reach of  amateurs and would require 
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the kind of  funding and actionable intelligence that comes from state sponsorship. 
The Stuxnet attack also incorporates elements of  the other three incidents examined in this paper. 
First, it disrupted the systems that monitored physical components, like the Davis-Besse worm 
infection. Second, it interfered with programmable logic controllers, like the Browns Ferry data 
storm. Third, it relied on there being some path from ordinary office computer to process control 
systems, as in the Hatch automatic shutdown. At the same time, the Stuxnet authors innovated on 
these features: Stuxnet did not simply disrupt sensor output, it faked it; it did not simply interfere 
with PLCs, it gave them specific instructions; finally, it did not rely on an internet connection to 
Natanz—it also traveled between computers on worker’s thumb drives31 and infected components 
destined for Natanz at their source in the Iranian chain of  supply.32 
Skeptics and alarmists can both use the Stuxnet attack to justify their positions. Alarmists can point 
to the vulnerability of  PCS and its direct effect on Iranian national interests. However, skeptics can 
argue that the Stuxnet attack required specific knowledge of  a particular facility and cannot be 
generalized to other systems, the same argument used by the Massachusetts Water Resource 
Authority. Further, the impact could hardly be described as catastrophic. However, it is important to 
look at the Stuxnet attack in the context of  history. Cyber attacks have evolved from the work of  
amateurs and professional criminals into a serious endeavor for states engaged in international 
disputes. States have begun to use cyber attacks not just to gather intelligence or control information 
networks, but to damage physical infrastructures. While the damage is nowhere near a “digital Pearl 
Harbor”, the trend is clear: states are actively pursuing cyber attacks as an instrument of  foreign 
policy while advancing the technical know-how such attacks require. 
 
Lessons 
These four incidents hold important lessons for the cyber security of  nuclear facilities and critical 
infrastructures in general. First, skeptics claim that PCS are immune from attack since they are not 
connected to the internet. However, the Davis-Besse incident shows that this is a misconception; 
even operators who try to monitor and protect every connection cannot be sure they know about all 
of  them. Stuxnet even traveled on portable thumb drives to infect computers that were not 
connected to the internet. Second, skeptics argue that PCS are immune from attack since they are 
different from ordinary computers. However, all four incidents demonstrate that PCS have become 
interoperable with ordinary computers, making them vulnerable. Third, vulnerabilities are more 
complicated than both skeptics and alarmists realize. Alarmists often invoke the danger of  hackers 
taking control of  a power plant, but these incidents show how unintelligent computer viruses and 
even malfunctions in small devices can have big unexpected effects. This suggests that even though 
nuclear facilities are vulnerable to attack, a malicious hacker would have difficulty making sure an 
attack works precisely as planned. Even so, states are working make cyber attacks more precise, 
supplementing their methods with intelligence from other sources. 
 
Cyber security and nuclear safety regulations 
As states take a greater interest in launching cyber attacks against nuclear facilities, they should also 
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take a greater interest in protecting their own facilities against attack. This means translating the 
lessons of  previous incidents into workable guidance and regulation for plant operators. So far, this 
has been lacking, both from the United States government and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). The nuclear industry does not have the expertise to handle such threats on its own, 
as evidenced not only by the incidents covered here, but also by the lack of  compliance with NERC 
critical asset identification standards.33 
However, the agencies charged with providing the necessary guidance may not have that expertise 
themselves. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) did not issue an Information Notice 
after the Hatch shutdown as it had for the Davis-Besse and Browns Ferry incidents. The NRC is 
aware of  its expertise gap and is actively addressing it. In January 2008, the NRC's newly established 
Computer Security Office launched a working group to develop an Information Security Strategic 
Plan (ISSP) for 2010 to 2015. The working group found that cyber security issues at nuclear plants 
were handled in an "ad hoc" manner, since the NRC's staff  with cyber experience were both limited 
and widely dispersed about the country. The NRC set up an Information Security Steering 
Committee to coordinate the activities of  these dispersed experts under the ISSP, including the 
development of  new rules and regulatory guidance for cyber security at nuclear facilities. Part of  that 
process will be implementing a 2008 recommendation from the Office of  the Inspector General to 
develop a program of  cyber security inspections at nuclear power plants.34 The ISSP outlines plans 
to use the NRC’s licensing and inspection authority to enforce cyber security standards at nuclear 
facilities,35 however, it is too early to judge the effectiveness of  these efforts. 
While the IAEA lacks the enforcement powers of  the NRC, it still has an important role to play as 
inspector and advisor to the nuclear programs of  other nations. However, it seems to be a bit slower 
than the NRC in developing its cyber security expertise. Its most recent technical guidance on the 
matter seems to be “Security of  Information and Instrumentation & Control Systems at Nuclear 
Facilities” released in 2007. However, this guidance fails to account for documented PCS incidents 
in both nuclear and non-nuclear facilities and the reported experience of  penetration testers. For 
example, the guidance states that cyber security at nuclear facilities can be achieved using the same 
methods and tools developed for IT security.36 However, the Browns Ferry data storm was created 
by either a failed PCS component or normal network operations; IT security would not have 
predicted the resulting failure of  the reactor pump VFDs. Since then, Stuxnet has further 
demonstrated the inadequacy of  basic IT security, since it infected PCS components in the Iranian 
supply chain rather than looking for a direct network connection to Natanz. The guidance also 
recommends developing a network diagram documenting all external connections, however, the 
assumption that all external connections were known and controlled was the basis for the supposed 
invulnerability of  PCS. Even in the IT world, penetration testers have found that network diagrams 
are often grossly inaccurate and only create a false sense of  security. While the IAEA guidance does 
give some sound advice for basic cyber security, it does not begin to address the unique challenges 
presented by PCS. The IAEA is continuing to develop its expertise in this area, especially since the 
Stuxnet attack, however, the current state of  official guidance and regulation suggests that those 
responsible for protecting nuclear facilities from cyber attack are less prepared than their potential 
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aggressors. 
 
Conclusion: A mixed bag 
While some cyber security incidents have occurred at nuclear power plants, crossing the imaginary 
boundary between IT and PCS and shutting down reactors, so far the potential for damaging a 
nuclear reactor appears theoretical. Scott Lunsford, a penetration tester for IBM, says government 
mandated safeguards would prevent a hacker from triggering a meltdown. So far, no catastrophic 
damage has resulted from a cyber attack against a nuclear facility. The same cannot be said for other 
sectors, as in the case of  the Maroochy water incident, and the Stuxnet attack has demonstrated that 
states are likely pushing the development of  new tactics and capabilities in cyberspace. 
Although the experience of  the nuclear sector lags behind that of  non-nuclear facilities in cyber 
security and PCS, nuclear plants must also comply with stronger safety regulations and inspections. 
Although he NRC's cyber regulations are still being developed, its existing regulations have put 
several incidents on the public record that would have gone unreported by non-nuclear power 
plants. This parallels the trend of  cyber security in e-commerce. In the early 2000's, banks and online 
merchants commonly suffered cyber attacks that potentially revealed their customers private data to 
hackers. To protect their reputations, they hired consultants to quietly fix their systems under a non-
disclosure agreement. Eventually, California passed SB1386, requiring any company that did 
business in the state of  California to notify their customers if  a hacker could have potentially 
accessed their private data. After the law went into effect in July 2003, the extent of  the hacking 
became public knowledge and companies began to invest in cyber security to reassure their 
customers before they suffered an attack. Oil, gas, and electric companies have been active in 
protecting their PCS from cyber attack, however, they still have little incentive to report the attacks 
they suffer. No regulation requires it, and companies fear their information could be made public 
under the Freedom of  Information Act if  they do. The years from 2010 to 2015 could prove 
decisive in the field of  PCS security. If  the NRC can implement the same sort of  rigorous 
inspection and reporting requirements for cyber security as they have for physical security and safety, 
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The Republic of China (Taiwan hereafter) and the People’s Republic of China (China hereafter) are 
two particularly attractive targets for internet hackers. Reports have found that, compared to other 
countries in the Asia and Pacific regions, China and Taiwan rank as the top two countries in terms 
of malicious computer activity.1,2 Reports have also shown that most hacking into Taiwanese 
computer systems is initiated from within China and most hacking into Chinese systems originates 
within Taiwan.3,4,5,6,7 
Malicious computer activity across the Taiwan Strait not only impacts computer users in Taiwan and 
China but it also affects numerous users in other countries as well. It is not only a problem for 
China and Taiwan to remedy, nor is it one that they alone should deal with. As a matter of fact, 
reports have found that there have been a number of computer attacks against the US that 
originated from computers in Taiwan but were controlled by command and control servers in 
China.8 
The current lack of formal mutual cooperation between Taiwan and China has become a bottleneck 
for the successful investigation of transnational cybercrime. Therefore, the establishment of other 
feasible mutual cooperation options between Taiwan and China has become an important concern 
not only between Taiwan and China but for all countries. 
Impeded by the present political situation, there is currently no formal mutual assistance agreement 
against crime between Taiwan and China.a However, there exists a level of quasi-formal and 
informal cooperation between law enforcement agencies, and these include “the Kinmen 
Agreement”, “the Agreement on Cross-Strait Mutual Assistance in Crime Matters” (hereafter, the 
Agreement on Mutual Assistance), and informal police-to-police cooperation. It is arguable whether 
these existing cooperation methods are applicable to cybercrime issues because cybercrime is 
potentially more sensitive for both governments as opposed to more conventional crimes.  
This paper will introduce cases of cybercrime across the Taiwan Strait and the existing mutual 
cooperation methods used against crime. Based on interview data, it will also examine the use of 
quasi-formal agreements signed by non-governmental organizations under the authorization of both 
governments, and it will then examine the role played by informal relationships between police 
officials. In each case, the paper will examine obstacles these strategies face in obtaining 
cooperation. 
 
◆ ◆ ◆ 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a The Government of  People's Republic of  China (China) claims sovereignty over Taiwan. Consequently, there is no 
possibility for Taiwanese and Chinese governments to sign a formal mutual agreement. For the special political situation 
between Taiwan and China, see Chapter 7 of  The Republic of  China Year book 2009, Cross-strait Relations at 
http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/06Cross-straitRelations.pdf. 
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Methodology 
Thirty-eight interviews (including four focus groups, one in China and three in Taiwan) with a total 
of 44 interviewees were conducted in Taiwan and China during the years 2008 and 2009. All the 
interviewees interviewed in Taiwan are coded with the letter “T” while those in China are coded 
with the letter “C”. The number following the letter refers to the case record. For example, T001 
means the first interview done in Taiwan. 
Interviewees were selected purposely based on their work experience or background. People with 
knowledge of information security and cybercrime were potential samples for this research. These 
included but were not limited to IT people in government agencies and private companies, police 
officers, prosecutors, and other professionals in cybercrime and information security, such as 
professors, managers of legal compliance in companies, and information security experts in big 
accounting firms which audit information security and conduct staff training in organizations. They 
were categorized into four groups: public sector, private sector, law enforcement, and other 
professionals. 
The concept of data saturation, whereby data is collected until no new information is obtained,9 was 
adopted by this research as the basis to decide the sample size. Except for the interviews in the 
categories of public sector and law enforcement agencies from China, interviews in other categories 
all reached the point of theoretical saturation. 
In Taiwan, there were 23 interviews with 28 interviewees. There were only three interviewees with 
less than ten years experience in information security or related areas. All other interviewees in 
Taiwan had more than ten years working experience in this area. Four participants were female.  
Among all the interviews in Taiwan, ten were conducted with 12 participants from the private 
sector; five interviews were conducted with seven participants from the public sector; four 
interviews were conducted with five participants from law enforcement agencies such as the police 
and prosecutors; and four professors were interviewed who were experts in law, information security 
issues or criminology. 
In China, 15 interviews were conducted and 16 people participated. Seven interviews were 
conducted with eight participants from the private sector; three policemen were interviewed as well 
as five professors. With regard to the experience levels of the interviewees in China, only two had 
experience in the related area of less than ten years. In terms of gender, only one interviewee was 
female.  
There were no Chinese government agencies willing to be interviewed. As well, there were no 
Chinese prosecutors interviewed. However, in lieu of formal prosecutors, some professors 
interviewed were also concurrently serving as deputy chief procurators. Their contributions helped 
overcome the lack of data from government officers and prosecutors in China. 
 
Cases of Cybercrime Across the Taiwan Strait 
The special political situation between Taiwan and China, and their often antagonistic relationship, 
has encouraged the growth of malicious activities between them. It has been reported that both 
Taiwan and China possess net-armies which hack into their respective counterpart government 
systems to conduct cyber espionage and to steal sensitive data.10,11,12 Additionally, websites of a 
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sensitive political nature, such as those criticizing the “one China policy” are usually prime targets 
for distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS). b   
As an example, a significant number of cyber attacks occurred in 1999 when a special state-to-state 
relationship was declared by then-President of Taiwan Teng-hui Lee. In that year President Lee 
declared in an interview with Deutche Welle that relations between Taiwan and China were of a state-
to-state nature, or at least a “special” state-to-state relationship existed. Seeing that interview as a 
possible pro-Taiwanese independence declaration, nationalistic Chinese hackers cracked into 
Taiwan’s government websites to show their anger. Government websites such as those belonging 
to the Administrative Yuan, the Control Yuan, the National Assembly, and Presidential Executive 
Office were replaced with an image of the Chinese five-star flag and with political statements such as 
“Taiwan is an indivisible part of China”. As revenge, Taiwanese hackers spontaneously responded in 
kind. They hacked into Chinese government websites and replaced the image of China’s national 
flag with the Taiwan national flag.13,14 
This example is not isolated and similar events occur often. In 2002, a website constructed by the 
“Taiwan Tea Party”, which supports the independence of Taiwan, suffered consistent and serious 
DDoS which paralyzed its operation. A huge quantity of spam and messages from China was sent to 
the website, shutting it down (Chen 2002).15 In 2005 and 2006, Taiwan’s Ministry of National 
Defense was hacked into and computers in the Minister’s Office and the Secretary’s Office were 
infected with trojans and spyware.16 The Acting Director of the National Security Bureau in Taiwan 
has said that a Chinese cyber army launched more than 3,100 attacks against Taiwanese government 
systems in 2008, and this does not include attacks against the private sector. Their purpose was 
mainly related to stealing data and sensitive information.17 
However, not all cyber attacks across the Taiwan Strait have political motivations. Some hackers do 
it simply for revenge, fun, or profit. For example, Shau et al. (2005) has suggested that at least 60 per 
cent of the cybercrime occurring in China is financially motivated.18 Among all targets, banks, the 
stock market and other financial agencies are the main victims. A senior police officer mentioned 
that the website of his institute was once hacked into and a Chinese national flag (usually called the 
“five star flag’ in Taiwan) was inserted on the main page, showing off the hacker’s ability to hack 
into government agencies (T017). 
 
Existing cooperation models against crime  
Although there is no inter-governmental mutual assistance agreement between Taiwan and China, 
there are two agreements signed by non-governmental organizations with government support or 
authorization. One is the agreement in relation to extradition, the Kinmen Agreement, which was 
signed by the Red Cross Society of the People’s Republic of China and the Red Cross Society of the 
Republic of China with support from both governments. The other is the Agreement on Cross-
Strait Mutual Assistance in Crime Matters. It was signed in 2009 between the Taiwan-based Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF), and the mainland-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 
Straits (ARATS).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
b A distributed denial of  service (DDoS) attack makes web sites or other network services unavailable to users by flooding 
the resource with spurious requests from many computers. 
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As a framework for the swift repatriation of stowaways and criminals, the Kinmen Agreement on 
Handling Deportation of Wanted Criminals and Suspects was signed in 1990 between the Red Cross 
Society of the People’s Republic of China and the Red Cross Society of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan). This was the first bilateral agreement between Taiwan and China since 1949, although 
both governments did not sign it but authorized non-governmental organizations to sign. It was also 
the first document between the two countries to contain “quasi-judicial” mutual assistance 
provisions and is recognized as a precedent for the Agreement on Cross-Strait Mutual Assistance in 
Crime Matters.19 
The Agreement contains provisions for the repatriation of individuals who have illegally entered 
either country, as well as repatriation of criminals and suspects. Although it is concerned mainly with 
the repatriation of certain categories of people, it does imply cooperation between Taiwan and China 
in the arrest of criminals and suspects. According to informal statistics, between 1990 and January 
2009, more than 38,000 persons who had fled to China were repatriated, including some serious 
criminal offenders.20 
Immediately following the signing of the Kinmen Agreement, the Straits Exchange Foundationc was 
established in Taiwan in November 1990 and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 
Straitsd was established in China in December 1991. These two non-governmental organizations, 
both authorized by their respective governments, have become the main channels for official 
communications between Taiwan and China. In 2009, the Agreement on Cross-Strait Mutual 
Assistance in Crime Matters was signed by these two organizations. That agreement is recognized as 
a milestone in cooperation against crime between Taiwan and China. 
Containing 24 articles in five chapters, the Agreement covers the extent of cooperation, the types of 
crime covered, mutual assistance in crime investigation and evidence collection, and other 
administrative aspects. Unlike the Kinmen Agreement, which focuses on the repatriation of 
criminals or suspects, this agreement focuses on collaboration in combating crime and the arrest of 
criminals.  
Mao-Su Huang,e the Deputy Director-General of Taiwan’s National Police Agency,f comments that 
the Agreement has institutionalized collaboration in combating crime.21 Positive comments were 
also made by a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China at a news conference held in December 2009: 
The Agreement realized the institutionalisation, generalisation and comprehensive nature of  the 
judicial mutual assistance across the Taiwan Strait. Since entering into effect in June, it is 
executed very well with significant outcomes. It promoted greatly the efficiency of  collaboration 
between both sides, and protected the rights and interests of  citizens on both sides.22 
Not surprisingly, there has been criticism of the Agreement on Mutual Assistance. Some 
commentators think that both sides have been too optimistic when praising its benefits. Tong (2009) 
doubted that China would extradite criminals and suspects under the new Agreement because China 
did not always send criminals back under the previous Kinmen Agreement. He noted that China 
refused to repatriate stowaways under the Kinmen Agreement for a certain period of time when the 




f He was commissioner of  the Crime Investigation Bureau when the Agreement was signed. 
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Chang (2010) also advised that although some requests had been made by Taiwan, “they are still 
pending and the attitude of the Chinese Government in terms of cooperation is the most important 
factor.” He said, in an interview with Taiwanese Government officials, that trust between Taiwan 
and China is the key to the success of the Agreement. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Agreement 
on Mutual Assistance is still hugely reliant on the political situation between, and the attitudes of, 
both Taiwan and China—especially the attitude of China.24 
 
Informal police-to-police cooperation 
Apart from the above quasi-formal agreements against crime, informal police-to-police cooperation 
is often used to advance crime investigations. Some senior police and academics said that limited 
mutual help with investigations has been secured privately and that some guan-xi (關係 “informal 
relationships”) exist between the police in Taiwan and China.  
Guan-xi, which resembles the idea of social capital, plays a very important role in different aspects in 
Chinese society.g As Yang notes in her anthropological work on Chinese culture, the term guan-xi 
literally means relationship. However, she argued that in the context of the gift economy, “it has the 
sense of social connections, connections which must be carefully initiated, preserved and renewed 
through the giving and receiving gifts, favors and dinners or banquets.”25 It can be built on pre-
existing relationships such as classmates, people from the same native-place, relatives, superiors and 
subordinates in the same working place and so on.26  
Guan-xi between people also represents the trust between them. Based on guan-xi, police from both 
sides can build mo-chi (默契 “unspoken consensus”) that facilitates crime investigation across the 
Taiwan Strait. As a senior investigator said, even under the political barrier, some crime problems 
still need to be cleared and this informal police-to-police relationship can help solve the problem: 
Many things can be done privately and not be discussed formally. It is related to the status of  
Taiwan. We think this is the most troublesome thing to us…It is just like the mo-chi between you 
and me. We know our “bosses” are like aliens to each other, but in order to achieve outcomes, 
we need mo-chi (T017, senior police officer).  
A senior law enforcement officer in Taiwan also illustrated the existence of informal police-to-police 
relations and cooperation between Taiwan and China. He said that some police in the Crime 
Investigation Bureau in Taiwan had some guan-xi with the public police in China. They could deal 
with some cases “under the table”. That is, there is some unofficial cooperation.  
For example, in 2005 a cross-Strait kidnapping case was cleared with the help of informal police-to-
police cooperation. While there was no formal mutual cooperation between Taiwan and China, the 
police in Taiwan, in order to solve the case, used their personal relations (guan-xi) to request help 
from police in China. The criminal was finally arrested by police in Macao and was sent back to 
Taiwan. Interestingly, official press releases do not emphasize this informal police-to-police 
relationship as it might be criticized for being “under the table”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
g There are doubts about the similarity and differences of  guan-xi and social capital, especially in the field of  
anthropology, where some argue that guan-xi is an essential and defining elemental part of  Chinese culture, while others 
believe that guan-xi is little more than a Chinese word for social capital which can be found in all societies, see more 
discussion at e.g. Gold, Guther, & Wank (2002), Jacobs (1979), King (1991), Smart (1993), Yang (1988). Here, the 
original expression guan-xi is used to avoid any misunderstanding that might result from using other terms, such as 
“social capital”. 
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Inevitably, there are some defects that diminish the effectiveness of informal police-to-police 
cooperation. One is that guan-xi is usually exclusive to the persons who build it and it does not 
usually last long. It is difficult to pass to others. Therefore, guan-xi might not work if the person 
changes position or leaves his job. Furthermore, informal police-to-police cooperation is still highly 
dependent on a positive political environment for guan-xi to be effective. In other words, if the 
relationship between Taiwan and China improves, the police may be able to achieve more. Equally, 
if the relationship between the countries worsens then little will be achieved. 
 
Cooperation against cybercrime across the Taiwan Strait 
From the discussion above, we can see that a number of alternate forms of cooperation against 
crime exist to cover the current lack of formal cooperation between Taiwan and China. These 
include quasi-formal mutual cooperation and informal police-to-police cooperation. 
Theoretically, quasi-formal cooperation agreements, such as the Kinmen Agreement and the 
Agreement on Mutual Assistance should be sufficient for Taiwan and China to cooperate in 
combating cybercrime. This is supported by most of the interviewees. All elements for cooperation 
against cybercrime, such as mutual assistance in crime investigation and evidence collecting, and 
extradition, are included in these two agreements. Academics, both in Taiwan and China, believed 
that the agreements should be able to be used as a model for cooperation against cybercrime. 
Elements of cybercrime, such as hacking and other malicious activities, were proposed for inclusion 
in the Agreement on Mutual Assistance by the Taiwanese negotiators.27 However, cybercrime 
received no special mention in the final document. This may have been because cybercrime was not 
seen as a first order issue or that it was too sensitive for governments to address explicitly.  
However, should attitudes change, the use of the generalized term “other crimes” in the Agreement 
on Mutual Assistance could cover cooperation on cybercrime for those cybercrimes which are not 
sensitive, such as purely economic crimes like fraud. Indeed, some cybercrime cases have been 
pursued under the agreements. For example, since the signature of the Agreement on Mutual 
Assistance, at least 100 computer fraud crime groups have been investigated and hundreds of 
criminals and suspects involved in computer fraud have been arrested.28  
Although the agreements seem to enable Taiwan and China to cooperate when combating 
cybercrime, a police officer in China argued that it was a time-consuming and complicated process 
(C008). This is an understandable position. For example, the Agreement on Mutual Assistance is 
unclear as to which agencies have charge of the investigation and collection of evidence. In 
accordance with the text of the agreement, it seems that all requests need to be made between 
ARATS and SEF through assigned contact points, and those requests must be made in writing. This 
inevitably causes delay in the investigation and evidence collection.  
Apart from the quasi-formal agreements listed above, informal police-to-police cooperation is 
another channel for cooperation when investigating cybercrime across the Taiwan Strait. As advised 
previously, a level of guan-xi already exists between certain police officers in China and Taiwan, 
leading to informal cooperation on major crimes. As a senior police officer said, for computer fraud 
cases, they cooperate “under the table” first in crime investigation and evidence collection. Through 
the use of guan-xi, they can ask “their friends” to locate criminals so that they can obtain accurate 
information on the criminal’s whereabouts. When the case is ready to close, they will then formally 
apply for mutual assistance to the appropriate contact officer in charge of the region and seek the 
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arrest of the suspect criminals. This approach is more efficient than simply sending out a request to 
ARATS without any helpful background information. 
Notwithstanding some success in this mutual assistance against cybercrime, the methods used have 
been limited and only apply to certain types of cybercrime. Most police interviewed were still very 
pessimistic about cooperation between China and Taiwan against cybercrime.  
A senior police officer in China said that they seldom dealt with transnational crime cases, and if a 
case was related to Taiwan, there was even less chance of it being pursued. Similarly, some senior 
law enforcement officers in Taiwan said that, according to their experience or their understanding, 
when a crime originated overseas the local police could usually do “nothing”: 
For Taiwan and China, zero. There is no mutual help between Taiwan and China. We try to tell 
them and ask for their help, but … basically there is no response (T004, senior police officer). 
T004, a senior police officer in Taiwan, explained that this might be because some hackers were 
hired by their respective governments. Cooperation when combating cybercrime, especially when 
that cybercrime was directed against government agencies, was likely to be awkward even when both 
sides trust each other. As Professor Susan Brennerh indicated in her book Cyberthreats: The Emerging 
Fault Lines of the National State, it is quite impossible for the sponsoring state to cooperate in the 
investigating efforts: 
When what is ostensibly cybercrime is state-sponsored - as is increasingly true of  economic 
espionage - the efficacy of  the civilian law enforcement response process breaks down. The 
sponsoring state will almost certainly refuse to cooperate with the investigative efforts of  the 
victim state’s law enforcement officers, and thereby thwart the crime response process.29 
Apart from government-sponsored crime, it was also argued by interviewees that it was highly 
improbable that governments would cooperate when investigating “hacktivism” which supports 
their own national interests. For example, if an attack against a Taiwanese website originated in 
China, and that website specifically opposed China’s “one China policy”, it can be safely predict that 
neither Taiwan nor China would offer much cooperation when investigating that matter. The case of 
the attack against the official website of the 2009 Kaohsiung Festival, which screened The Ten 
Conditions of Love, a documentary about exiled Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer, is a good example. 
Given this, the Chinese and Taiwanese governments could only be anticipated to cooperate if it 
could be shown that the hackers involved were not supported by either government or that the 
hacking behavior was not related to national interests. Senior police officers in Taiwan believed that 
cooperation against cybercrime between Taiwan and China was possible if it was an economic issue 
and there is no government element involved and when both sides suffered from the same crime: 
…Only when they are suffering from the same crime do they cooperate. Do you remember the 
news not long ago about organised crime being cleared-up? That group not only committed 
fraud in Taiwan, but also in China. That is why China’s public police were willing to help. See, I 
reckon only when they are suffering will they help! (T017) 
When the Chinese suffer from the same crime will they start to cooperate? The best example of  
cooperation is the mutual assistance between Taiwan and China in terms of  telecommunication 
and computer fraud! (T004) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
h NCR Distinguished Professor of  Law and Technology at the University of  Dayton School of  Law. 
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In addition to the nature of the cybercrime being committed, the political situation between Taiwan 
and China can determine whether cooperation is possible. Most interviewees agreed that there 
would be no cooperation between Taiwan and China when the political situation was tense. T017 
said that, when Cross-Strait relations were tense, Taiwan could hardly get a response from China to 
their requests. Even informal police-to-police cooperation stopped—even guan-xi does not work 
when relations between Taiwan and China are bad. 
The attitude of the respondent can also play a vital role in cooperation. According to a senior police 
officer’s experience, most of the SEF requests to ARATS for help in cybercrime investigations 
remain unsettled. Often only a pro forma reply to the request for assistance was received, even when 
the relationship was good: 
I remember that we had requested ARATS, via SEF, to investigate some cybercrime problems. 
For most of  the cases, we did not get any response from them. Even if  there was a reply, the 
answers were usually pro forma, telling us that they could not find any information or there was 
nothing wrong (T017). 
 
Conclusion 
It is encouraging that, despite the lack of formal mechanisms for mutual assistance between Taiwan 
and China, there are alternative channels for cooperation, including quasi-formal mutual assistance 
and informal police-to-police cooperation. Current agreements and informal police-to-police 
cooperation could potentially be sufficient for police from both sides to cooperate with their 
counterparts against cybercrime. However, that cooperation can only apply to cybercrimes that are 
purely economic in nature and where there is no government involvement. Cooperation is more 
likely when both countries are suffering from the same crime, such as computer fraud. 
There are still barriers impeding cooperation between the two countries. Cooperation, whether 
quasi-formal or informal, is highly dependent on the official or governmental relationship between 
Taiwan and China existing at the time of the criminal investigation. Quasi-formal cooperation and 
informal cooperation through guan-xi between police forces work well only when the official 
relationship between Taiwan and China is not tense. Moreover, as indicated by interviewees, the 
attitude of respondents can also potentially impede cooperation. 
It may be a long time before the two governments are able sign an official agreement for formal 
mutual assistance against cybercrime. However, with current improvements in the relationship 
between Taiwan and China, there is optimism that the situation could change in the near future. In 
the interim, and in the absence of a formal agreement, it is all the more important to advance the 
current quasi-formal and informal cooperation between Taiwan and China. 
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The Situation is Under Control 




Just prior to his confirmation as Commander of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), General 
Keith B. Alexander identified the need to improve cyberspace situational awareness as one of his 
central responsibilities—and challenges.1 This mission is rooted in the need to monitor computing 
activities across the 15,000 networks and seven million devices that compose the Department of 
Defense (DoD) information and communications technology (ICT) enterprise.2 Complicating this 
mission further, USCYBERCOM must also conduct offensive operations in cyberspace and 
potentially assist the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to defend other information 
systems across the federal government and US critical infrastructures.3 These demands help explain 
what a Defense Information Systems Agency official recently called DoD’s “insatiable desire for 
situational awareness” in cyberspace.4   
Unfortunately for those who would seek to assess USCYBERCOM’s progress, no “gold standard” 
exists for cyberspace situational awareness. It remains challenging to envisage the bounds of future 
situational awareness capabilities, let alone performance metrics. Thus, analyzing the present state of 
cyberspace situational awareness for a potential competitor yields a richer understanding of the 
relative US position. China serves as a sensible counterpart in this comparative analysis for several 
reasons. Some cite China as a potential military competitor5 and future conflicts appear poised to 
spill into (if not originate in) the cyber domain.6 China’s military, moreover, has a well-documented 
offensive cyberwarfare doctrine that in some respects appears directed toward the United States.7  
In parallel, China conducts sometimes “pervasive” internet censorship as part of “one of the largest 
and most sophisticated filtering systems in the world,” according to the OpenNet Initiative.8 
Policymakers traditionally view internet censorship as a human rights issue.9 In the past year, 
however, several technology companies have cogently argued that censorship also acts as a barrier to 
trade.10 This article complements these views with a discussion about internet censorship’s security-
related implications. Specifically, this analysis argues that some of China’s internet censorship 
techniques likely improve that nation’s cyberspace situational awareness—which could affect the 
outcome of a conflict in cyberspace.11  
This argument advances in section II with an explanation of some key concepts. Section III 
provides a brief survey of the development and state of cyberspace situational awareness within the 
United States. Sections IV and V, respectively, explain some key features of the cyber domain in 
China and gauge their impact for cyberspace situational awareness. Section VI identifies some 
inherent tradeoffs in the composition of the cyber domain in China. Section VII offers some 
conclusions and implications for US policymakers.12 
 
                                                
a This paper presents the author’s personal views and does not reflect those of any institution with which he is affiliated. 
The author wishes to thank Edward Monan and several anonymous reviewers, whose thoughtful comments on previous 
drafts helped to greatly improve this paper. 
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II. Definitions and key concepts 
Internet censorship 
For the purposes of this analysis, “internet censorship” is any measure enacted to restrict internet 
accessibility, processes, functions, or content based on sociopolitical imperatives. Such efforts take 
place in four distinct realms: laws and regulations; norms; markets; and architecture.13 This paper 
emphasizes the architectural component, which has the most direct implications for situational 
awareness. The term “architecture” refers to the physical dimension of cyberspace, described in the 
National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations as “information systems and networks, computers 
and communications systems, and supporting infrastructures.”14 Architecture also encompasses 
network design and layout and the nature of connections with other networks, including those 
beyond national borders.  
States can conduct censorship at four key architectural layers. These include, from least to most 
centralized: individual computers, organizations, internet service providers (ISPs), and the internet 
backbone.15 China has generally succeeded in exerting control at each of these four layers. For 
example, at the individual layer, Tencent’s popular instant messaging software QQ incorporates a 
client-based keyword-blocking utility.16 At the organizational layer, China requires all internet 
content providers, such as websites, to gain licenses and comply with censorship mandates.17 China 
“outsources” some censorship responsibilities to ISPs, the third architectural layer, which must 
police domestic internet content and enforce website closures.18 Finally, this article centers on 
China’s robust filtering activities at the internet backbone layer, specifically at gateways between 
Chinese networks and the rest of the internet.19 
 
Cyberspace situational awareness 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has no official, unified definition for “cyberspace situational 
awareness,”20 despite the term’s frequent, government-wide usage since the mid-2000s.21 The 2006 
National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, however, sufficiently describes the concept:  
Cyberspace situational awareness enables commanders and planners to assess the current 
situation, collaborate on courses of action, take action, and anticipate opportunities and 
challenges in the domain. Automated tools must be employed to provide near-real time 
notification of anomalous activity and properly inject appropriate data into operational views 
to characterize the cyberspace activity. This situational awareness combined with proper risk 
assessments, including intelligence loss or gain determinations, will allow commanders to 
make the best decisions on courses of action.22 
An important distinction must be made between enterprise situational awareness and domain situational 
awareness.23 Enterprise situational awareness is visibility of the events and activities within a single 
entity’s networks. This capability would, for example, enable informed computer network defense 
operations. However, defense against a large-scale, coordinated cyberattack targeting government, 
private industry, and privately owned infrastructures would require some level of situational 
awareness across multiple entities. Thus, domain situational awareness is visibility of events and 
activities spanning national (and ideally international) networks. This analysis addresses certain 
enterprise-level issues, but focuses on the domain level.  
◆ ◆ ◆ 
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III. Cyberspace situational awareness in the United States 
Policy 
In many aspects of the cyber domain, particularly those that relate to computer network attack, US 
capabilities appear far more advanced than the policies that guide their use. This resembles the early 
phases of the nuclear age, prior to the advent of deterrence theory and other guiding concepts.24 
Situational awareness is one of the few elements of the cyber domain where policy is more fully 
developed than enabling technologies and capabilities (discussed below). Several official documents 
and statements indicate the US government’s policy: more is better.  
With respect to enterprise situational awareness, the 2011 US budget states that the Office of 
Management and Budget should initiate ICT programs and activities that promote the “[m]ove 
towards Situational Awareness across the Government”. The document asserts that: 
More frequent reporting, near or at real-time, is imperative for developing situational 
awareness across the Federal enterprise. The use of Security Information Management or 
Security Information Event Management tools will assist in progressing towards real time 
security awareness and management in the Government.25 
This echoes two components of the US Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). 
One specific initiative is to “[d]eploy an intrusion detection system of sensors across the Federal 
enterprise.” This project aims to bolster the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team’s (US-
CERT) situational awareness so it can better develop and distribute security information.26  A related 
initiative is to “[p]ursue deployment of intrusion prevention systems across the Federal enterprise.” 
This step intends to improve situational awareness with more advanced capabilities to “identify and 
characterize malicious network traffic” in order to prevent its access to protected networks.27 
Official US government statements also indicate the need to improve domain situational awareness. 
USCYBERCOM Commander Keith B. Alexander recently characterized the cyber domain as one 
with “strong adversary capabilities and weak situational awareness.” He described intentions to: 
build an effective cyber-situational awareness in real time through a common, shareable 
operating picture. We must share indications in warning threat data at Net speed among and 
between the various operating domains. We must synchronize command-and-control of 
integrated defensive and offensive capabilities, also at Net speed. 28 
The CNCI also addresses the need for domain situational awareness capabilities. Specifically, one 
initiative is to “[c]onnect current cyber ops [operations] centers to enhance situational awareness.” 
This element seeks to “support shared situational awareness and collaboration across six centers that 
are responsible for carrying out US cyber activities,” through “shared analytic and collaborative 
technologies.”29 Similarly, DHS’s Information Technology Sector-Specific Plan, an annex to the 
2010 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, includes as a primary goal the need to enhance 
cyberspace situational awareness across the entire ICT sector.30 
 
Capabilities 
Progress towards these ends is evident, but legal and structural impediments remain. With respect to 
enterprise situational awareness, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano recently announced that the 
Einstein 2 program, which can “automatically detect and disrupt malicious cyber activity,” is almost 
fully deployed across the “.gov” domain. Development of the program’s third iteration is already 
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underway.31 For its part, DoD designated that one of USCYBERCOM’s key missions is to elevate 
cyberspace situational awareness.32 Additionally, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense William 
Lynn, DoD has deployed three layers of protection for US military networks, or the “.mil” domain,33 
of which two relate to industry best practices and appear to enhance situational awareness 
capabilities. These initiatives appear to have already stemmed malicious activity: security incidents on 
DoD networks decreased in 2010 for the first time in a decade.34 
The US government has made other advancements at the domain level. In what probably constitutes 
the third and outermost layer of protection for its networks, DoD reportedly developed 
relationships with “tier 1” ISPs to identify and terminate malicious traffic from foreign sources 
before it reaches DoD networks.35 DHS operates a “dashboard” that aggregates routing data and 
other information to provide real-time situational awareness about the state of the internet 
throughout the country. Critically, it can show when segments of the internet are down, which can 
help officials diagnose whether the root cause of the outage might be a natural disaster, a power 
outage, or perhaps an attack. The dashboard can even highlight areas with extreme network 
congestion, which could draw attention to infrastructure malfunctions.36  
Recent government efforts reveal imperfect but strengthening capabilities. For example, a DHS-
sponsored exercise series called “Cyber Storm” seeks to strengthen preparedness for a contingency 
in cyberspace, in part by improving enterprise and domain situational awareness. One of the 
exercise’s four primary objectives is to “[v]alidate information sharing relationships and 
communications paths for collecting and disseminating cyber incident situational awareness, 
response and recovery information.”37 One of the key findings of the exercise’s first iteration, held in 
February 2006, was that “[p]layers were challenged when attempting to develop an integrated 
situational awareness picture and cohesive impact assessment across sectors and attack vectors.”38 
The following exercise, held in March 2008, cites improvements but maintains that a better 
“[u]nderstanding [of] the interconnectedness and cause/effect relationships between actions taken 
by each organization would help to maintain broad situational awareness and galvanize a holistic 
approach to cyber response.”39 
Several factors, however, may impede the US government’s prospects for improving cyberspace 
situational awareness.40 First, with respect to laws, the executive branch operates on the basis of 
guidelines included in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Electronic Communications and 
Privacy Act, the PATRIOT Act (which includes provisions for National Security Letters), the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, and elsewhere. These laws can limit 
surveillance and other activities related to situational awareness, particularly with respect to data 
traversing US infrastructures or involving US persons.  
Other checks, from a structural standpoint, include the market-driven and generally decentralized 
development of internet infrastructures. For example, US internet traffic destined abroad (and 
foreign traffic destined for the United States) may transit any of the approximately 19 undersea cable 
landing facilities along the US east and west coasts. Moreover, internet access in the United States is 
multimodal. That is, users may connect in a variety of ways, including by satellite. Finally, there are 
thousands of ISPs operating in the United States, of which perhaps a half dozen are considered “tier 
1” providers. As a corollary, numerous US firms operate the international gateways that connect the 
internet in the United States to internet infrastructures in foreign countries. This multitude of 
infrastructure actors severely complicates efforts to establish comprehensive cyberspace domain 
situational awareness. 
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IV. Key features of the cyber domain in China41 
In contrast to the abundance of US policy statements on cyberspace situational awareness, there are 
few indicators of Chinese views on the subject. In absolute terms, China’s enterprise situational 
awareness status is probably less robust than its US counterparts.  Software piracy—rampant in 
China—adversely affects software updates and patch implementation, management, and other 
essential aspects of system hygiene. Microsoft, for example, recently estimated that 90 percent of its 
software in use in China is pirated.42 Depending on the vendor, unlicensed server software may not 
get critical patches and copies of antivirus software may not receive updated definitions. Pirated 
operating systems, web browsers, media players, and other software may also be affected. 
Notwithstanding recent efforts to counter the use of pirated software, it remains a common feature 
of even Chinese government computers.43 Moreover, China consistently ranks in the top few 
countries with the most infected computers (although the United States is often in its company).44  
Less is known about the state of China’s domain situational awareness. However, an analysis of 
some of the key architectural features of the cyberspace domain in China can inform our 
understanding of China’s cyber domain situational awareness prospects. Two features in particular—
international gateways and filtering capabilities—bear closer examination. 
 
International Gateways 
The overwhelming majority of China’s internet communications with the outside world transit just 
three international gateways located in Beijing in the north, Shanghai in the east, and Guangzhou in 
the south.45 By design, this centralization of international internet connections allows Chinese 
authorities to exert a significant level of control over data traversing China’s national-level 
networks.46 As a result, according to an account by journalist James Fallows, Chinese authorities can: 
physically monitor all [internet] traffic into or out of the country. They do so by installing at 
each of these few “international gateways” a device called a “tapper” or “network sniffer,” 
which can mirror every packet of data going in or out…. “Mirroring” is the term for normal 
copying or backup operations, and in this case real though extremely small mirrors are 
employed. Information travels along fiber-optic cables as little pulses of light, and as these 
travel through the Chinese gateway routers, numerous tiny mirrors bounce reflections of 
them to a separate set of… computers. 47 
 
Filtering Capabilities 
This separate set of computers, known colloquially as China’s “Great Firewall,”48 allows Chinese 
authorities to surveil and filter internet traffic. The system leverages a set of mechanisms to evaluate 
and analyze data destined for networks outside China.49 Most of this data is directed to the rest of 
the internet via undersea cables to transit points throughout East Asia. However, when the Great 
Firewall identifies data considered offensive by China’s authorities, the system resets the attempted 
connection in order to terminate the data transmission.50 Technical research corroborates Mr. 
Fallows’ account that data transiting between internet destinations in China and abroad are indeed 
mirrored to “out of band” machines, which are separate and parallel to the core routers that 
facilitate the transactions.51 Computer researchers refer to these machines as intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as 
applications or devices for “monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and 
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analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of violation 
of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.”52  
China’s IDS employs deep packet inspection (DPI), described by computer security firm Symantec 
as the ability “to look within the application payload of a packet or traffic stream and make decisions 
on the significance of that data based on the content of that data” (emphasis original).53 This is 
opposed to less sophisticated utilities that only analyze data labels, such as packet headers, which 
contain important but less specific information like data origin and destination. In practice, for 
example, DPI allows the Great Firewall to not only determine when a user in China attempts to 
establish a connection to www.bbc.co.uk (label), but whether the specific page requested contains 
keywords related to the Falun Gong (content).  
An important caveat here is that DPI technology is generally effective only on data sent “in the 
clear,” or in unencrypted form. This weakness allows users to leverage virtual private networks 
(VPN) to “scale” the Great Firewall. Although Chinese authorities could simply block encrypted 
internet traffic destined abroad, such a move could immediately halt substantial levels of foreign 
business operations in China, which the government is loathe to do.54 However, at least one firm 
with business activities in China55 advertises DPI suites that use signatures to communicate a “broad 
range of criteria, header information, actual payload, bi-directional traffic information and the 
characteristics… even as applications get encrypted.”56 Such technologies raise questions about how 
long encrypted traffic can remain a sanctuary from China’s data inspections.  
 
V. Implications for situational awareness 
There are at least five components of situational awareness: intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, environmental monitoring, and common operating picture. 57 For the purposes of 
this analysis, reconnaissance is how to find something; surveillance is how to track it; and 
intelligence is the actionable results of these (and related) efforts.58 Environmental monitoring 
involves the attempt to understand natural and unnatural influences and events and their impact on 
a domain. Common operating picture is a holistic and shared view of information from numerous 
inputs and sources across a domain. Although complete treatment of how each concept applies to 
cyberspace is beyond the scope of this paper, all are at least somewhat affected by the architectural 
features of China’s censorship regime.59 
Intelligence: The Great Firewall’s main function is traffic inspection and termination, but the system 
could conceivably employ features designed to collect intelligence. Although it would be infeasible 
to retain all of the mirrored internet traffic for any longer than it takes to conduct a cursory 
inspection, some data could be stored for later analysis and exploitation.  If such a capability is in 
place, data could be flagged for retention at the router or IDS level based on predetermined 
parameters. Rules implemented within this system could direct potentially useful data to a storage 
device for further review by human analysts. 60 Though the existence of such an inspection regime is 
purely speculative, the possibility appears within reach of China’s authorities. From a technical 
standpoint, it would even be less challenging than basic filtering (given that the central obstacle 
would be the review and manipulation of all data, which China currently does). 
These potential intelligence-related features present more cause for concern when viewed in light of 
China’s ability to essentially import internet traffic from abroad. Although by no means unique—
ISPs in other nations have previously done the same thing—China briefly demonstrated this 
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capability in April 2010. In that incident—which could have been accidental—state-owned China 
Telecom propagated improper routing information that instructed US and other foreign internet 
traffic to transit Chinese servers. The event affected traffic to and from, among other things, the 
web domains associated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and all four US military 
services. 61 Affected traffic would likely have transited the Great Firewall and thus could have been 
censored or exposed to any intelligence collection or analysis features inherent in the system. 
Surveillance: China’s control of the internet extends beyond censorship and into surveillance.62 The 
general trend is well documented,63 but specific architectural aspects of the Great Firewall enhance 
these capabilities. In particular, all information that transits the Great Firewall must include origin 
and destination information, such as Internet Protocol address or domain; these data could 
conceivably be logged according to rules triggered by keywords or other predetermined 
specifications.64 Such information could have numerous applications; for example, it could explain 
accounts of software used by Chinese authorities that issues reports when specific users in China 
access banned websites.65 Of note for people outside China, the Great Firewall reportedly has 
bidirectional functionality, meaning users outside China can be prevented from viewing content on 
sites hosted within China.66 By extension, foreign users who attempt to connect to Chinese nodes 
may face some level of surveillance, to the extent that it is inherent in the systems that compose the 
Great Firewall.   
Reconnaissance: If Chinese authorities leverage the Great Firewall to analyze traffic, the limited 
number of international gateways would simplify the process. That virtually all internet traffic 
between China and the outside world transits three locations would significantly bind the complexity 
of information mining.67 Consider a scenario where Chinese authorities sought to locate a user based 
on a unique identifier, such as email address:68 the fewer the transit points, the more efficient the 
search. For people and systems within China, it would be far more pragmatic to conduct 
reconnaissance activities at the ISP level, but the gateway level would serve to identify the correct 
ISP to approach in the event that that information was not already known to authorities. Again, 
bearing in mind the Great Firewall’s bidirectional nature, such reconnaissance activities may also 
have implications for users outside China communicating with users or connecting to sites inside 
China. China’s network infrastructure abroad may also have a suite of features that, though perhaps 
harmless, could facilitate reconnaissance. China Telecom Americas Corporation’s promotional 
materials call its network “traceable,” with “real-time monitoring and reporting.”69   
Environmental Monitoring: One of the unique features of the cyberspace domain is the relative 
indivisibility of the domain itself from a given system within that domain. In the space domain, the 
evaluation of space weather and events to determine how they might affect space systems, such as 
satellites, is fairly straightforward (though certainly not simple). In cyberspace, enterprises should 
similarly seek to understand significant “environmental” events, such as viruses and malfunctions in 
exterior networks.70  But in the sense that the government has a vital interest in ensuring that the 
cyber domain itself—and all domestic segments in particular—remain operational, it would be 
arbitrary to separate a system of interest from other networks and infrastructures. For example, a 
key government entity might perfectly defend its networks, but if an attack disrupts upstream 
systems—such as the entity’s ISP—key systems could still be denied access to the internet. In this 
light, environmental monitoring should include any substantial event in the cyber domain. 
Some evidence suggests that Chinese authorities previously configured routers on national-level 
networks to filter virus-related traffic.71 To bolster this capability, gateway filtering could operate in a 
similar capacity. The limited number of gateways creates comprehensive vantage points that could 
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help inform battle damage assessment across networks and enable mitigation efforts, particularly if 
an attack lacks a readily identifiable signature to block. For example, monitoring bandwidth might 
help administrators estimate the effects of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks targeting 
numerous sites across multiple ISPs. Other “sensors” at the gateways could monitor routing data to 
provide reports on route hijacking or other unusual events. 
Common Operating Picture: The confluence of all traffic at just three international gateways could also 
help enable threat characterization analysis. China has an active marketplace for data mining utilities, 
frequently used for surveillance applications,72 which may offer efficient ways to identify and parse 
events and trends on the internet. Unity of effort is another imperative related to common operating 
picture, and these “hubs” could facilitate a coordinated response by various Chinese entities in the 
event of a cyberattack or counterattack. Moreover, any of the monitoring scenarios described above 
could have implications for tracking “red” and “blue” forces (in China’s usage, friendly and 
adversary, respectively), which is a key component of traditional common operating picture 
requirements.  
 
VI. Balancing equities 
Although situational awareness is clearly a desirable end in the cyber domain, the means employed 
by China imply some important tradeoffs. Three in particular merit consideration. First, states must 
determine how to allocate resources in the cyber domain, and skilled personnel might well be the 
key constraint. Second, states may have an interest in the topology of their networks, particularly the 
extent to which infrastructure should be centralized. Third, if states view cyberspace as a potential 
domain of conflict, infrastructure and force structure should be optimized to address contingencies 
based on threat assessments.  
Resource allocation: China’s censorship system is rooted in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
perception about how best to maintain regime stability. Thus, from a defense planning perspective, 
derivative gains in situational awareness are essentially free. However, it is unclear that Chinese 
investments in ICT architecture reflect risk analyses that weigh censorship against the potential 
implications of a cyberwar, which could also affect the CCP’s ability to maintain social control. 
Assuming a finite pool of human capital with the advanced skills required to operate in the cyber 
domain, man-hours expended on censorship activities—even with their ancillary benefits for 
cyberspace situational awareness—come at the expense of other cyberwar-related capabilities.73 
These could include, among other things, cyber defense, cyber offense, command and control in 
cyberspace, and cyberspace reconstitution capabilities.  
Network topology: The CCP’s perceived need for censorship influenced the development of China’s 
internet architecture, resulting in considerable centralization. Though helpful for filtering and 
situational awareness, this comes at the expense of robust redundancy. This may be an acceptable 
trade-off at the enterprise level.74 However, centralized architecture at the domain level raises 
questions about the sustainability of internet access in a conflict scenario. This could have 
implications for China’s ability to retaliate in cyberspace, which raises two key concerns. First, the 
absence of an assured second strike capability in cyberspace could give China a destabilizing 
incentive to strike preemptively.75 Second, denied access to the cyber domain could promote 
escalation into other domains of war.76 
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Figure 1: China’s primary international internet connections77 
Source: 
China Telecom, USA 
 
China’s international gateways connect its six national-level networks78 to one or more of seven 
international land-submarine cables that link China to the rest of the internet.79 Causing a power 
outage in the three cities that host international gateway facilities, a conceivable objective in the 
context of conflict in cyberspace, could substantially isolate China from the rest of the internet.80  
The physical disruption of one or more of the China’s international submarine cables could cause 
even greater damage. Attacks on such cables would be a severe measure, as their disruption would 
adversely affect the internet throughout the region.81 Moreover, US cyberspace operations have been 
canceled in the past for fear of unknown or uncontrollable effects.82 Still, while global 
telecommunications interdependence may be more entrenched today than ever before, the 
precedent for targeting undersea communications cables dates back to the First World War.83 Such 
assets could be targeted again in a serious contingency. 
Domain optimization: The discussion above suggests that China’s domain configuration yields some 
benefits for cyberspace situational awareness at the expense of other features. Although China’s 
internet architecture probably evolved independently of these considerations, the Chinese 
government is nonetheless left with forces and infrastructure that appear better equipped to handle 
limited rather than total conflicts in cyberspace. For example, in a constrained engagement, 
situational awareness might be the primary consideration, as it could enable smart defense and 
mitigation techniques. By contrast, in a more intense scenario, emphasis might shift to favor 
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offensive actions. To the extent that resources available for each mission are drawn from the same 
pool, this would relatively diminish the importance assigned to domain situational awareness 
activities. Of course, it remains unknown whether this orientation aligns with the Chinese 
government’s threat perception regarding the relative likelihood of limited versus severe conflict in 
cyberspace.  
 
VII. Policy Implications 
The United States must consider the security implications of internet filtering activities. This may 
influence the urgency and means with which US policy seeks to address internet censorship and 
related activities abroad. By extension, a policy that accounts for the nexus between certain 
censorship activities and cyberspace situational awareness could alter present views about the 
permissibility of US firms’ assistance to foreign countries’ censorship activities.84 In particular, 
situations that involve technology transfer could require some sort of regulation or oversight.85  
The United States must also “balance equities” in cyberspace. One of the defining characteristics of 
the United States’ approach to the cyber domain, particularly when compared to China, is the 
numerous limitations on the US government’s ability to collect information that might aid situational 
awareness. While the United States requires improved cyberspace situational awareness, it remains 
unclear whether this end necessitates or justifies drastic adjustments to legal and structural checks. 
Alternative technologies or systems—perhaps even administered by private entities, such as a 
consortium of ISPs—might yield sufficient domain-level situational awareness capabilities. Such a 
mechanism might eventually serve as the foundation for a wider application of what appears to be 
DoD’s approach to stopping malicious traffic at the “tier 1” ISP level.86 Policymakers must 
recognize, however, that such activities are not costless and could require government support 
through subsidies, tax breaks, or other incentives.  
In the event that improvements do require alterations to existing legal and structural checks, each 
change should reflect a deliberate, inclusive, and transparent review process. Moreover, each 
potential change ought to be justified through cost-benefit analyses related to resource allocation, 
network topology, and domain optimization, as described above, or another compelling rationale. 
Finally, on a tactical level, internet architecture should be a central factor in the context of defensive 
and offensive cyberspace operational planning.  
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The Dollar’s Vulnerability and the Threat to National Security 
MAJ Neil C. Everingham, US Army, and Professor David A. Anderson, USMC (ret) 
 
Introduction 
The decline of the United States as a great power has been a popular topic with pundits for years. 
The same is true of the United States dollar (subsequently referred to as “dollar”) and its role as the 
world’s dominant international currency. Not surprisingly, the loss of such currency status has 
historically coincided with the loss of great power status.1 These two interrelated issues have recently 
become of increasing concern due to rising levels of United States deficit spending and a growing 
debt burden. The unease revolves around whether the dollar’s status, and by extension, the United 
States’ international leadership role, are still viable as its debt approaches record levels in absolute 
terms. Epitomizing this concern are the recent calls for an alternative to the dollar as the world’s 
central international currency by China, Russia, Brazil, and some OPEC nations, coupled with 
increasing pressure from large vote-carrying members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
the United States to reduce its voting shares.  
The purpose of this study is to identify looming vulnerabilities that may lead to the demise of the 
dollar undermining United States power and compromising its national security. In identifying 
vulnerabilities, we consider economists’ views of international currency dominance and Benjamin J. 
Cohen’s state of power theory, apply those views to the historical case of the United Kingdom, and 
then compare that to the present-day US in light of the National Security Strategy.  
 
Modeling for Analysis 
There are two opposing thoughts on the potential decline of the United States’ international 
leadership that help shape this examination. Paul Kennedy, of Yale University, wrote in 1987 that 
the transition between great powers was a slow process that centered on the incumbent’s struggle to 
balance short-term national security demands and long-term economic interests.2 The inability to do 
so can lead to high levels of debt undermining overall economic viability. Niall Ferguson, of Harvard 
University, disagrees with Kennedy’s model of a gradual rise and fall. Instead, he suggests great 
powers are complex adaptive systems that collapse as the result of sudden and catastrophic 
malfunctions, caused by their inability to finance public debt that accumulates due to high levels of 
deficit spending.3 The United States has avoided this problem, in part, because of the dollar’s 
international role.  
                                                
1 Jeffrey A. Frankel, "Still the Lingua Franka: The Exaggerated Death of the Dollar" Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4 (July 1995), 
12. 
2 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 536, 540. 
3 Niall Ferguson, “Complexity and Collapse: Empires on the Edge of Chaos,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (March/ April 
2010): 20, 30. 
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The central purpose of an international currency today is to serve “as a store of value for central 
banks’ and governments’ international reserves.”4 While this may be the central role of today’s 
international currencies, there are two other functions: to serve as units of account denominating 
international obligations and pricing commodities, and as media of exchange for transactions 
between other currencies.5 The dollar is currently the primary international currency fulfilling each of 
these roles, which provide financial and security benefits to the US. Two principle benefits of the 
dollar’s special status as the leading international currency are a regular inflow of foreign financing 
that keeps the United States interest payments on its debt low and its current and capital accounts in 
balance, thus enabling relatively large and sustainable deficit spending.6 
Based on the theory of international currencies, a nation must have a relatively large economy for its 
currency to ascend to an international role. Once elevated, it becomes a competitor for the 
predominant role in international finance, which it will only achieve if it is dominant in trade. 
Therefore, it must have the dominant share of world trade volume and should lead in the value of its 
exports. Helen Rey of the London Business School finds that trade flows are the key determinant in 
currency internationalization.7 Paul Krugman finds that only the currency of a nation that is 
important in world payments can serve as an international vehicle currency and that once that role is 
established it is self-reinforcing.8 The payments are the result of imports and exports; thus, to be 
important in world trade a nation must be active in trade, which reinforces Rey’s findings. The 
process is reinforcing because once the role of vehicle currency is established, the transactions in 
that currency swell due to decreasing transaction costs. Krugman also finds that the process of 
change between vehicle currencies is catastrophic, as an amplifying loop of declining trade leads to 
increasing transaction costs and further declines in trade volume.9  
Based on the ideal economic structure, the nation of the lead international currency should also be a 
net creditor and possess a current account surplus. Once this structure has been achieved, the nation 
enjoys financial benefits as well as increased power in the international state system. Having gained 
this predominant position, the importance of the currency in trade reinforces the currency’s 
strength. The nation risks losing its position as an international currency by running up a gross 
government debt that results in a debt to GDP ratio of over 90% which correlates with increased 
inflation and low real economic growth. 10 11 This erodes confidence in the currency as a store of 
                                                
4 Barry Eichengreen, "Sterling's Past, Dollar's Future: Historical Perspectives on Reserve Currency Competition" 
(Lecture, Economic History Society, Leicester, UK, April 10, 2005), 2. 
5 Paul Krugman, "Vehicle Currencies and the Structure of International Exchange," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 
12, no. 3, (August 1980): 513. 
6 Congressional Research Service, Dollar Crisis: Prospects and Implications, by Craig K. Elwell, RL34311 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, January 8, 2008), 6. 
7 Rey, Helene. "International Trade and Currency Exchange." The Review of Economic Studies 68, no. 2, (April 2001): 457. 
8 Krugman, "Vehicle Currencies and the Structure of International Exchange," 523. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S Rogoff, "Growth in a Time of Debt," National Bureau of Economic Research 
working paper15639, Cambridge, MA (January 2010): 9. 
11 Reinhart and Rogoff, find a positive correlation between rising inflation and a high gross government debt to GDP 
ratio, defined as higher than 90% in the United States. Therefore, the ratio of gross government debt to GDP should be 
a key factor in evaluating the fit of an international currency for a leading reserve role. 
Strategic Insights • Spring 2011 Volume 10, Issue 1 53
value and fits with the logic that a nation should only resort to expansionary fiscal policy in times of 
desperation. 
Finally, Benjamin J. Cohen’s state of power theory has noteworthy application. Cohen identifies two 
operational dimensions of state power: the ability to control the behavior of others and the ability to 
act unilaterally.12 These dimensions operate within a framework of two kinds of state power in a 
political economy, relational and structural—relational being the ability to get another power to do 
something they would not normally do, while structural power is the ability to shape the framework 
of international relations.13 Clearly, both types of power are important, but structural power, by 
allowing a nation greater influence in creating future systems, is the more beneficial. Cohen finds 
that the store of value role of an international currency increases the issuing nation’s autonomy, thus 
increasing its relational power.14 The more significant structural power derives from a currency’s 
international dominance of all three roles of money: 
1. as a store of value for central banks’ and governments’ international reserves                  
2. as a unit of accounting denominating international obligations and pricing commodities          
3. as a unit of exchange for transactions between other currencies15 16                                  
Thus, all nations whose currency serves as an international reserve enjoy a proportional increase in 
international autonomy and influence. However, the nation whose currency dominates all three roles 
has the advantage of shaping the rules of international relations. It follows that the dollar’s central 
place in all three roles contributes to the foundation of United States international power. Therefore, 
preserving the dollar’s predominance should be treated as a national security issue. Losing the 
dominant currency position puts at great risk the dollar’s valuation resiliency and the international 
appeal of dollar denominated debt (currently two thirds of all foreign held reserves are denominated 
in dollars or dollar denominated debt). This would ultimately impact the US ability to further finance 
its growing debt—a debt often used as an economic stimulant and a means to help finance the 
defense budget, as well as diplomatic interests around the world. Furthermore, major imported 
commodities that are denominated in dollars, such as oil, would likely become valued in another 
currency, adversely affecting the dollar’s purchasing power of such commodities and further adding 
to a growing US trade deficit.  
 
Historical Perspective: The Sterling-Dollar Transition 
The transition between the sterling and the dollar is significant for two reasons. First, it is the most 
recent such reordering of the international financial system. Second, according to Eichengreen, 
based on the role of an international currency as a store of value for central banks and governments, 
it is the only such transition in history.17 
                                                
12 Benjamin J. Cohen, "Currency and State Power," Presented at a conference to honor Stephen D. Krasner, Stanford 
University, (December 4, 2009): 4. 
13 Susan Strange, States and Markets, ((London: Pinter Publishers, 1994): 24-25. 
14 Cohen, "Currency and State Power," 21. 
15 Barry Eichengreen, "Sterling's Past, Dollar's Future: Historical Perspectives on Reserve Currency Competition," 2. 
16 Krugman, "Vehicle Currencies and the Structure of International Exchange," 523. 
17 Barry Eichengreen, "Sterling's Past, Dollar's Future: Historical Perspectives on Reserve Currency Competition"  
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Chinn and Frankel provide a useful summary of this transition, which began in the late nineteenth 
century and lasted until the conclusion of World War II. The United States economy surpassing the 
British economy in size was the first key event in the transition. This occurred in 1872, but the 
United States lacked a robust financial system until the creation of a central bank in 1913.18 During 
World War I, the United States and the United Kingdom change roles in terms of debtor and 
creditor and trade balances. The United Kingdom became a net debtor, while the United States 
assumed the role of net creditor as its exports surpassed those of the United Kingdom in 1915.19 
Despite the dollar’s emergence and growing role in international trade and finance, the level of 
foreign-owned liquid sterling assets was twice that of the dollar as late as 1940, but by 1945 the 
currencies reserve positions were reversed.20 This paints a picture of a slow shift in the underlying 
structure conditions, which were necessary, but not sufficient for the transition. The system was only 
tipped in the dollar’s favor through the crisis presented by the Second World War.  
 
Analysis of the Sterling’s Economic Foundation 
Various estimates of economic size have the United States surpassing the United Kingdom before 
the beginning of the 20th century. As stated, Chinn and Frankel put the exact year as 1872. Table 1 
shows that the United States had the largest economy and the fastest rate of growth throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century. The most notable aspect of this data is the dramatic growth of the 
United States’ economy relative to the other nations. Despite having become twice the size of the 
British economy by 1913, the dollar did not claim the primary role in the international economy 
until the end of World War II. This is not unexpected. Having a relatively large economy was a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a nation’s currency to achieve a primary international 
role. 
 
Table 1 - GDP (billions of 1955 US dollars) 
 
 
The data appear to support Rey’s finding that GDP is not the primary factor in determining the 
internationalization of currency. It may also reflect the inertia of incumbency due to the self-
reinforcing tendencies of holding the predominant position. Chinn and Frankel note that part of the 
explanation lies in the fact that the United States’ financial system was not properly developed until 
                                                
18 Chinn and Frankel, "The Euro May Over the Next 15 Years Surpass the Dollar as Leading International Currency," 1. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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the creation of the central bank in 1913. Even with this condition met, it would take an additional 30 
years and the events of World War II for the dollar to claim the top spot. 
One explanation for the slow relative growth of the United Kingdom’s economy, compared to the 
United States can be found in each nation’s debt to GDP ratio. Figure 1 shows that the United 
Kingdom surpassed the 90% threshold identified by Reinhart and Rogoff in 1917, exceeding 200% 
briefly from 1945 thru 1948. As expected, this correlates with a slower rate of economic growth. 
However, as the data in table 1 show, the United Kingdom’s economy grew more than the United 
States’ from 1929-1937, during the Great Depression. This serves to undermine a notion of a 
causative link between high levels of debt to GDP and slow economic growth. However, there are 
signs that the levels of debt carried by the United Kingdom were eroding international confidence in 
the sterling as a store of value. 
 
Figure 1 – Percentage of Government Gross Debt to GDP Ratios (US and UK) 
 
 
The dramatic increase in British debt coincides, not unexpectedly, with the transition of the nation’s 
net investment position. In the years leading up to World War I, The United Kingdom maintained a 
current account surplus despite a persistent trade deficit.21 This is due to large and growing income 
                                                
21 Laney, "The Reserve Role of the Dollar and the United States as Net Debtor," 5. 
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receipts from overseas investments, which were reinvested overseas annually.22 These long-term 
loans to the rest of the world kept the United Kingdom’s net investment position positive, a 
condition that would change during World War I. During the war, the United Kingdom transitioned 
to a net debtor while the United States transitioned to a net creditor due in large part to British 
borrowing to fund the war.23 While the British current account recovered during the 1920s, the 
deficits returned in the 1930s to combine with defaults on debt, and declining values of overseas 
assets, eroding the nation’s net worth.24 The existing debt, defaults on current obligations, and 
persistent current account deficits resulted in the erosion of confidence among investors, leading 
them to diversify their assets by selling off their sterling reserves. 
Eichengreen points out that there was a perceptible shift occurring in reserve currency allocation 
during the interwar years. He notes that the dollar’s increasing role in trade as a unit of account and 
in payments contributed to international diversification in reserve currency holdings, with the 
sterling holding a 57% share and the dollar rising to 19% in 1928.25 This is in line with estimates 
from Chinn and Frankel that the level of foreign-owned liquid sterling was double that of dollars as 
late as 1940.26 However, despite high levels of debt and sustained current account deficits, the 
sterling maintained its leading international role.  
Rey’s hypothesis was that trade volume was the key determinant in the internationalization of 
currency. Matching this with Krugman’s finding that the process of transition would be catastrophic 
for the incumbent, it would follow that the sterling would give way to the dollar rapidly following 
the United States’ assumption of the top place in trade volume. Table 2 shows the United States 
gaining the largest share of world trade volume sometime between 1913 and 1928. Yet, this only led 
to slight diversification away from the sterling, not a catastrophic collapse. 
 
Table 2 – Percent Share of World Trade 
Year United States United Kingdom France Germany 
1890  9.8 22.4 10.2 10.3 
1913 12.9 15.5 7.3 12.1 
1928 17.3 13.7 6.1 9.3 
1937 16.0 14.1 4.8 8.3 
Source: Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 306-308. 
 
A partial explanation for the lack of a collapse might be the relative value of each nation’s exports as 
displayed in Table 3. According to these data, while the United States accounted for the largest share 
of world trade (ie, total value of exports plus imports) in 1928, in 1929 British exports were still 
                                                
22 Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey, The Economic History of Britain Since 1700: Volume 2: 1860 to the 1970s, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 289. 
23 Chinn and Frankel, "The Euro May Over the Next 15 Years Surpass the Dollar as Leading International Currency," 1. 
24 Floud and McCloskey, The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, 300. 
25 Eichengreen, "Sterling's Past, Dollar's Future,” 9. 
26 Chinn and Frankel, "The Euro May Over the Next 15 Years Surpass the Dollar as Leading International Currency," 1. 
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slightly more valuable. Therefore, evaluation of the trade role may need to balance volume and 
value. 
 
Table 3 - Value of Merchandise Exports (millions of 1990 US Dollars) 
 
 
It should be noted that the value of the United States’ exports was increasing from 1913-1929, while 
that of Britain were falling over the same period. This leads to the inference that the value of United 
States exports overtook those of Britain much earlier than the 1950 data can confirm. Yet it was still 
at least another 15 years before the dollar would surpass the sterling as an international currency. 
From the 1870s through 1939, the economic balance of power shifted from The United Kingdom 
to the United States. It began with the United States economy becoming the world’s largest. As the 
United States developed its financial institutions, the dollar began to play an important role in the 
international system. During World War I, the two nations exchanged their net investment 
positions, with the United Kingdom becoming a net debtor nation and the United States becoming a 
net creditor. The high levels of British debt and persistent deficits contrasted with the relative 
economic health of the United States, which slowly translated into patterns of international trade. 
However, the sterling maintained its role even after the United States held the dominant role in 
international trade. It took another world war to effect the change. 
These slow foundational changes resulted in conditions where British liquid assets and exports were 
insufficient to finance their war effort.27 In addition, the United States would not loan it money 
because it had stopped paying interest on debt from the First World War.28 The loss of investor 
confidence resulted in an unwillingness to provide further loans. The United Kingdom was forced to 
deplete their reserves and to sell its illiquid assets under unfavorable terms.29 The loss of these assets 
denied the United Kingdom the income that had kept its current account balance positive for 
decades and later, at least sustainable. Finally, after the Second World War crippled the United 
Kingdom’s economy, the dollar replaced the sterling as the dominant international currency. This 
transition in economic power would translate into changes in state power as illustrated by the 
following two examples. 
 
 
                                                
27 Floud and McCloskey, The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, 306. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Bretton Woods – An Example of Structural Power 
The creation of the Bretton Woods System during World War II provides an example of structural 
power and the role of economic strength as its foundation. American and British policy makers 
developed a joint plan for post war monetary arrangements that was adopted by 44 nations at the 
1944 Bretton Woods conference.30 The fact that the United States and the United Kingdom 
developed a plan that was subsequently adopted by the international community demonstrates that 
those two nations possessed structural power, or the ability to shape the framework of international 
relations. They used this power in an attempt to create an international system that reduced trade 
barriers, promoting free trade as a way to raise standards of living, create interdependencies, and 
cement post war peace through global institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank.31 The system attempted to lower trade barriers by reconciling exchange rate 
stability and domestic economic autonomy by creating an explicit code of conduct for the 
international monetary system and institutional controls centered on the IMF.32 Because the United 
States possessed the largest economy, it held the largest share in the IMF stabilization fund intended 
to finance balance of payment deficits, reconstruction and long-term development.33 In controlling 
the largest share of these institutions, the United States benefited greatly through an increased ability 
to control the behavior of other nations in the international system. The Suez Crisis demonstrates 
the importance of this power to a nation pursuing its national interests. 
 
The Suez Crisis – Lost Autonomy 
When Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, he 
triggered an international crisis that demonstrated the importance of autonomy in international 
relations and made clear that the United Kingdom had lost a measure of theirs. In the days following 
the nationalization, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden stated that the incident was a vital national 
interest because 80% of Western Europe’s oil and commerce between the United Kingdom, India, 
Australia, and British colonies passed through the canal.34 The British collaborated with the French 
and Israelis on Operation MUSKETEER, a military operation launched on November 5th to seize 
the Suez Canal.35 However, significant reserve losses and the economic impacts of oil shortages 
combined to cripple the British effort.    
The action had cost the British $400 million in reserves by the end of the month and the United 
States would not support aid from international institutions without a complete withdrawal of 
forces.36 Britain did not have an alternative source of funds. The United States controlled its own 
                                                
30 Oatley, International Political Economy, 225. 
31 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy, (New York: Free Press, 
2008), 387-388. 
32 Oatley, International Political Economy, 225. 
33 Ibid., 227-228. 
34 Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991): 
79. 
35 Ibid., 117. 
36 Ibid., 138, 150. 
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markets as well as the IMF and World Bank.37 At the command of the United States, the United 
Kingdom was forced to recant an action it had labeled a vital national interest because it had run out 
of money. A great power must be able to act unilaterally to protect its national interests and the 
United Kingdom had lost this capacity with the loss of it economic dominance. Britain could forego 
American approval and friendship, but could not forfeit American money.38  
 
Lessons From the British Experience 
This transition illustrates a number of important points. Overall, it demonstrates a synthesis of 
Kennedy’s and Ferguson’s theories. The decline of the British Empire with the sterling as the 
dominant international currency was the culmination of over 50 years of slowly shifting economic 
fundamentals. The Suez crisis ultimately revealed that a shift in the balance of power had occurred 
between the UK and the US. The next important point is that despite high levels of debt and 
persistent current account deficits, the international community continued to provide financing to 
the United Kingdom. This continued despite the existence of a nation with a larger economy and an 
equal, or greater, role in trade. This reinforces Krugman’s finding that once a currency becomes the 
leading international currency its role is self-reinforcing. The collapse in the face of a crisis may 
indicate that he was also correct in his assessment that a currency’s fall from the top spot would be 
catastrophic. A final important finding is that the British collapse followed the government’s sale of 
its illiquid income producing assets. The loss of these assets prevented the United Kingdom from 
retaining its position of global leadership. In the end, the reasons for the collapse of the British 
Empire and the sterling are complex, but the primary lesson appears to be that through excessive 
reliance on deficit spending, the government robbed itself of the ability to function autonomously 
when it needed to. 
While this overview is useful in illustrating these points, it is important to acknowledge the context 
of that transition. American isolationism and the Great Depression may have slowed the process. 
These factors probably pushed investors to the sterling, which had the trust of the international 
community. This would be similar to the reaction of the international community to the latest 
financial crisis.39 
 
Prospects for the Dollar 
Analysis of the Dollar’s Economic Foundation 
The current position of the United States appears to be different from that faced by the United 
Kingdom a century ago. Unlike the position of the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the United States still has the world’s largest economy. Table 4 lists the ten largest 
economies measured by GDP. Only the Eurozone (European Union countries that also use the 
euro as a common currency) is close to matching the United States’ economic size. 
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Table 4 - Top Ten World Economies (including Eurozone) 
 
 
As reflected in figure 2, another difference is that the United States just crossed the threshold of 
90% debt to GDP ratio in 2010.  As was demonstrated in the British example, it is possible for a 
lead nation to endure this level for decades. However, the rising levels of debt projected by the IMF 
are cause for concern, as it may cause investors, both private entities and foreign governments, to 
seek other destinations for their capital. Examination of the trade roles provides further insight into 
the dollar’s economic foundation and identifies additional concerns. 
 
Figure 2 – Percent of US Government Debt to GDP Ratio (Projected Through 2015) 
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As the British case demonstrated, it is prudent to consider both trade volume and export values to 
analyze the strength of the United States and the dollar. According to table 5, the United States still 
accounts for the greatest share of the world’s trade volume (exports plus imports). However, six of 
the top ten nations, in terms of trade volume, are members of the Eurozone. From the table, their 
combined share of world trade volume is more than twice that of the United States, which, 
according to Rey, is the key determinant of the dominant international currency. However, the 
British case showed that the United States had passed the United Kingdom in terms of trade volume 
by 1928 without causing the sterling to collapse. 
 
Table 5 - 2009 Percent Share of World Merchandise Trade 
Rank Country 2009 Share of World Volume 
1 United States 10.6% 
2 China 8.8% 
3 Germany 8.2% 
4 Japan 4.5% 
5 France 4.1% 
6 Netherlands 3.8% 
7 United Kingdom 3.3% 
8 Italy 3.2% 
9 Belgium 2.9% 
10 Republic of Korea 2.7% 




Table 6 - Value of Merchandise Exports (US dollars) 
Rank Country 2009 Export Value 
1 China $1,204,000,000,000 
2 Germany $1,159,000,000,000 
3 United States $1,046,000,000,000 
4 Japan   $542,300,000,000 
5 France   $472,700,000,000 
6 Netherlands   $417,600,000,000 
7 Italy   $412,900,000,000 
8 Republic of Korea   $373,600,000,000 
9 United Kingdom   $357,300,000,000 
10 Canada   $323,400,000,000 
Source: CIA Factbook Country Comparison: Exports,” (accessed September 10, 2010). 
https:/www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2078rank.html 
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Table 6 shows that the United States does not hold the lead in terms of the value of its exports 
either. It currently sits third behind China and Germany. The fact that Germany is in front of the 
United States in terms of export value means that the Eurozone leads the United States in both 
measures of trade.  
At this point in the evaluation, there are indicators that the dollar may be vulnerable. The economic 
foundation of the Euro is nearly the same size as the United States, and the Eurozone accounts for 
more international trade in terms of both volume and value. Combined with the high levels of debt 
to GDP in the United States, which are expected to correlate with increasing inflation and slow 
economic growth, it is reasonable to expect investors may begin looking to diversify their holdings 
as they did during the interwar period. Another factor, which will erode investor confidence in the 
dollar as a store of value, is a growing trade deficit that would put downward pressure on the dollar 
if investors stop buying the currency as a reserve. This may lead to a rapid collapse as predicted by 
Krugman’s theory. 
The data show that the United States current account is increasingly negative which will heighten the 
vulnerability of the dollar if it follows current projections. Figure 3 shows a sharply negative 
projection of the United States’ current account between 1998 and 2006. The data show that the 
deficit nearly quadrupled from $213 billion in 1998 later bottoming at $803 billion in 2006, before a 
slight rebalancing in 2007 and 2008. 
 
Figure 3 - United States Current Account Balance of Payment Data (billions of US dollars) 
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The IMF projection for the 2010 current account deficit is $487 billion, which is still more than 
double the 1998 level and reverses a three-year trend of reduced current account deficits.40 While the 
nation’s deficits have come down from their peak in 2006, at nearly 5% of GDP they are too high to 
control the rising debt and are projected to continue increasing following 2010. A deficit to GDP 
ratio of 2% would likely prove to be a sustainable level, as it would allow GDP to grow, on average, 
at a faster rate than debt.41 This would equate to reducing deficits at 1998 levels, which may or may 
not be possible without serious tradeoffs.  
In order to understand what is possible, it is necessary to understand why the trade deficit is as large 
as it is. There are two explanations for the emergence of the current global imbalance. The first 
offered by Ben Bernanke is the “global savings glut,” which is the result of the developing world’s 
transition from net borrower to net lender.42 His argument is that developing countries lost some 
capacity to borrow because of financial crises in the 1990s. The long-term impact of these crises is 
that developing nations became less willing to borrow and run budget deficits. They have instead 
turned to accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by their central banks as a method of national 
savings. Finally, Bernanke holds that the rise in oil prices has resulted in an abrupt increase in 
revenue and saving for oil exporting nations. He argues that this excessive savings was attracted to 
the United States because of the technology boom in the 1990’s, the maturity and safety of its capital 
markets, and the unique role of the dollar as a reserve currency. 
The second explanation is the “money glut” as advanced by Martin Wolf.43 In this view, the United 
States monetary excess causes low nominal and real interest rates making credit attractive and 
available to consumers. This has the effect of lowering savings while increasing spending which 
absorbs imports. The dollar then loses value against floating currencies, but pegged currencies are 
kept low relative to the dollar by foreign currency intervention. In the end, this view argues that 
excess money creation by the United States forces the rest of the world to invest in the dollar as a 
foreign exchange reserve in order to control excessive demand and inflation. As Wolf points out, 
understanding which view is correct is important; if the savings glut is correct, the adjustment can be 
controlled, but if the money glut is more accurate then the adjustment will come at the cost of 
monetary stability.44  
 
Are the Global Imbalances Sustainable? 
While there seems to be consensus that the dollar will inevitably lose its predominance, there is wide 
disagreement on the process of transition and the end state. This is likely due to the uncertainty 
regarding the true meaning of the United States current account deficits and overall levels of debt. 
As previously stated, Kennedy and Ferguson have opposing views on the length of a possible 
                                                
40 World Economic Outlook Database at the International Monetary Fund website, 
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transition. Chinn and Frankel state that the Euro could replace the dollar as a single dominant 
currency as early as 2015.45 However, their conclusions were drawn in 2008, and the ongoing 
European debt crisis will likely impact investor confidence and, at the least, extend that timeline. On 
the other hand, Eichengreen sees the potential for two or three currencies to share the reserve role 
in the market in the 2020 – 2040 timeframe.46 In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the United 
States’ debt level, this disagreement also reflects the lack of numerous historical references.  
As stated earlier, the United States current account deficit is not considered indefinitely sustainable 
along the current trajectory. The question is how much higher can deficits and debt go before an 
adjustment occurs. Martin Wolf contends that the imbalances are sustainable as long as creditors are 
willing to finance the United States.47 What his statement implies is that the creditor nations are 
making a deliberate choice to buy the dollar and hold it as a reserve. This is in line with the example 
provided by continuing support for the sterling in the first half of the twentieth century. Therefore, 
to understand what is sustainable, it is necessary to understand why they continue investing in the 
dollar.  
The theory maintains that the capital will flow to the highest rate of return, seeking the best store of 
value. The Congressional Research Service offers reasons this might be the case for the United 
States and the dollar. They are that the United States has enjoyed greater productivity growth than 
most of the world since the mid 1990’s, higher interest rates due to the low level of domestic savings 
combined with deficit spending, and the theory of diminishing returns which in this case applies to 
developed countries’ need to invest abroad for efficiency reasons.48 The problem with this is that the 
returns are likely to get worse due to depreciation of the dollar. If investors are only seeking a high 
rate of return, they are likely to abandon the dollar. 
Paul Krugman argues that the dollar must depreciate. This is the result of his view that the trade 
deficit is not sustainable, that closing it requires a redistribution of world spending which requires a 
fall in relative prices of goods produced by the United States.49 This is nothing different from a 
normal balance of payments adjustment. The question revolves around the speed of this 
depreciation. 
The dollar was depreciating steadily at a rate of 3-4% annually from 2002-2006, but then declined by 
10% in 2007.50 The trend has been reversed as investors have flocked to the dollar during the recent 
financial crisis in search of a safe haven. As the world economy recovers, there is no reason to 
believe that the dollar depreciation will not continue. The crucial question to Krugman “is whether 
the dollar must eventually depreciate at a rate faster than investors now expect.”51 It is reasonable to 
infer that the investors expect and accept a rate of depreciation at or below 3-4% annually as they 
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did from 2002-2006. What is not clear is if they will accept a 10% decline like the one that emerged 
in 2007. Krugman argues that if investors fail to account for the required devaluation there will be a 
‘Wile E. Coyote’ moment were they look down and realize there is nothing supporting their 
investment.52 The question then becomes whether the dollar must depreciate faster than the 3-4% 
rate.  
Krugman evaluates two scenarios for dollar depreciation that help answer this question. The first 
scenario occurs over 20 years at an annual depreciation rate of 1.75%.53 This rate of depreciation is 
clearly under the 3-4 percent depreciation levels of 2002-2006. The problem with this rate is that 
after accounting for growth and valuation adjustments, it results in a net external debt to GDP ratio 
of 118%. As previously discussed, that level of external debt to GDP has never been sustained by a 
large nation, which makes it a dangerous course. In addition, Krugman finds that it might result in 
foreign ownership of more than one-third of the United States’ capital stock.  
The second scenario occurs over 10 years at an annual rate of 3.5%.54 The resultant net external debt 
to GDP ratio in this scenario, after accounting for growth and valuation adjustments, is only 58%. 
This scenario also avoids the problem of large-scale foreign ownership of the nation’s capital stock. 
This rate of depreciation is still within the range that was sustained from 2002-2006, indicating that it 
may be possible to close the United States current account deficit without a major dollar crisis. For 
this to happen, investors would have to expect and accept the dollar’s depreciation and the dollar 
would have to depreciate no faster than Krugman’s projected rate. While it appears that the current 
global imbalances are not sustainable, it seems plausible that an adjustment does not mean the end 
of the dollar as the predominant international currency. The fact that investors have already 
accepted the necessary level of depreciation over a five-year period indicates that they would be 
willing to accept it over the longer ten-year period in Krugman’s model. The reasons for this could 
be that they are more concerned with the ability to quickly retrieve their investment than they are 
with pure value retention. If this is the rationale for investment in the dollar, then this is where the 
true vulnerability of the dollar can be found.  
 
A Plausible Future for the Dollar? 
If investors are willing to accept some annual depreciation in exchange for the ability to quickly 
liquidate their reserves and intervene in a crisis, it should be asked whether there are investors that 
hold such a large share of United States securities that they alone pose a risk to the dollar’s status. It 
is impossible to know exactly what scenario might emerge to cause the dollar to lose its place as the 
dominant international currency, but it is certainly possible to evaluate existing vulnerabilities.  
Concern that China will seek to liquidate its large share of dollar holdings makes the unlikely 
assumptions that the rest of the world can absorb their share and that they are willing to accept 
significant losses as the value of the dollar plummets during the selloff. It could also result from 
some unforeseen crisis such as another world war, as was the case for the United Kingdom. 
However, because the United States is reliant on the international community to fund its current 
budget deficit, the real problem may reside in the economic health of those nations.  
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Table 7 shows the four largest holders of United States Treasury securities. This data shows that 
China is currently reducing its holdings in the dollar, while Japan and the United Kingdom are 
increasing theirs. Over the last year, Japan has increased its holdings by $95.4 billion, while the 
United Kingdom has increased its dollar holdings by $271.4 billion. The United States’ reliance on 
these nations to fund its budget deficit is reason to examine their economic foundation. Their 
domestic economic crisis could quickly affect the United States if they are unable to continue 
purchasing its debt, or if they are forced to liquidate dollar holdings in response.  
 
Table 7- Major Foreign Holders of US Treasury Securities (billions of US dollars) 
 
 
Figure 4 - Ownership of US Debt 
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Figure 5 - Japanese Debt to GDP Ratios 
 
This comes at a time when the United States is increasingly dependent on foreign capital to finance 
its budget deficits and as a result debt is increasingly owned by foreign investors, both private 
investors and governments. Figure 4 shows that as a percentage, more than half of the United States 
public debt is owned by foreigners. However, in real terms, both foreign and domestic investors 
have been increasing their ownership in recent years. The significance of this is that the United 
States in increasingly reliant on external sources of capital to fund its budget deficits. Because 
domestic investors have also increased their purchases of debt, it is not certain that they would be 
able to offset a rapid international selloff of United States securities. Nor is it likely, that they would 
be willing to invest in a security that was rapidly losing value. Two potential scenarios that could lead 
to the fall of the dollar present themselves in this data. 
Japan’s current role as a major holder of United States debt, combined with its own debt concerns 
may prove to be the spark that leads to the dollar’s loss of international predominance. Figure 5 
shows that Japan has a serious structural problem regarding its debt level. Its gross public debt to 
GDP ratio has been above Reinhart and Rogoff’s 90% threshold since 1995, and is projected to 
reach and surpass levels experienced by The United Kingdom during World War II. Even more 
concerning, is the projected growth in the net debt to GDP ratio, reaching 150% by 2015. If Japan is 
forced to sell off its reserves to deal with payment issues, as the United Kingdom was forced to 
during World War II, it might lead to Krugman’s Wile E. Coyote moment. This scenario is more 
likely when Japan’s falling savings rate is considered. Furthermore, the household savings rate in 
Japan has been falling from 15% in the 1980s to 2% in 2009 which is threatening Japan’s net savings  
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Figure 6 - United Kingdom Debt to GDP Ratios 
 
surplus and, in turn, its ability to export capital.55 A Japanese liquidation of dollar assets would put 
downward pressure on the dollar. This in turn, would reduce the value of dollar holdings around the 
world, potentially causing other investors to begin selling their dollar securities before the bottom 
falls out. This would be the equivalent of a bank run on an international scale. 
The United Kingdom’s economic health poses a similar problem. Figure 6 illustrates that, while their 
debt levels are not as high as Japan’s, they are predicted to rise above 90% of GDP within the next 
five years. The most concerning aspect of the United Kingdom’s debt is the rapid rate of growth 
following 2007, doubling by 2012. As the United Kingdom faces its rapidly growing debt, likely 
accompanied with higher interest payments, it may not be able to purchase additional United States 
debt. As Table 7 showed, the United Kingdom has increased its holdings of United States Treasury 
Securities by $271.4 billion over the last year. This has allowed the United States to continue 
financing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the large economic stimulus. However, an 
inability to purchase additional debt is not the real problem for the United Kingdom, much like the 
scenario with Japan; the problem emerges when the United Kingdom is forced to sell its reserves to 
cover its own payments or to intervene in a crisis that threatens its economy.  
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A resurgence of the sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe earlier this year could trigger such a 
scenario. Based on data in table 8, five high-risk nations owe the United Kingdom a total of $418 
billion. Three fourths of this amount is owed by Spain and Ireland, nations who have significant 
debt issues of their own.  
 
Table 8 - Debt Owed to the United Kingdom (billions of US dollars) 






Source: Bank for International Settlements, 2010 
 
Spain and Ireland have both experienced setbacks in their efforts to avoid future defaults. The Irish 
have announced an initiative to spend billions to prop up its banking sector while Moody’s 
downgraded Spain’s credit rating on September 30, 2010 over concerns about its current financial 
condition and prospects for growth.56 A default by either of these nations on obligations to the 
United Kingdom might force the United Kingdom to liquidate a significant portion of its dollar 
holdings. In either case, a major selloff of dollars by one of the top three holders could cause a 
panic, as investors would seek to sell their holdings before the value plummets. 
 
Impacts to National Security 
Just as it is impossible to predict exactly what the future of the dollar holds, it is impossible to 
predict exactly the second and third order effects of a dollar collapse. However, the falling value of 
the dollar would have important consequences because of the United States’ continued reliance on 
deficit financing. The inflow of foreign financing would be dramatically, if not wholly, reduced as 
the value of the dollar falls. Therefore, the United States would have to pay higher interest rates to 
fund future debt to offset the increasing uncertainty about its future value; this would place a 
restrictive constraint on future government spending. Any hope of covering this spending shortfall 
by increasing revenue through taxation is also unlikely to succeed in the short-term because of 
potential impacts to the domestic economy. Eventually, the economy would recover as the weaker 
dollar makes United States exports more affordable for the rest of the world.  
Such a crisis would force the United States Government to make immediate spending cuts due to 
the loss of international funding. The fiscal year 2010 budget provides an example of the risk. The 
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Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections for fiscal year 2010 anticipate $2.175 trillion in 
revenue balanced against $3.524 trillion in outlays.57 The budget deficit for 2010 is then $1.349 
trillion. This accounts for nearly all of the discretionary spending for 2010, which is $1.371 trillion.58 
In other words, the United States could only fund 1.6% of its 2010 discretionary spending without 
borrowing from foreign governments and private investors. This means that almost any disruption 
to the inflow of capital from these investors would force the government to suspend governmental 
operations, including overseas military operations or cut entitlements such as Social Security and 
Medicaid. Congress would likely try to spread the spending reductions across governmental 
functions, but the political reality is that cutting spending on overseas military operations is easier 
than cutting social programs for constituents. 
Even modest reductions in government spending would affect funding support for the National 
Security Strategy. The 2010 National Security Strategy outlines four enduring national interests – 
security of the United States, its citizens, allies and partners; prosperity through a growing United States 
economy in an open international system; respect for universal values throughout the world; and an 
international order advanced by United States leadership and international cooperation.59 Each of these 
national interests would be adversely affected by a dollar crisis.  
A key component of the national interest in security is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorism 
around the world.60 The frontline of this effort is in Afghanistan and Pakistan where the United 
States is fighting an insurgency, working to build an effective Afghan government, and looking to 
increase trust and respect with the Pakistani government while supporting their capacity to target 
extremists.61 It is likely that these would be among the first casualties of budget cuts, as the 
American public would demand the government prioritize a severe domestic crisis over the enduring 
war effort. Even absent calls from the public, it is unlikely the United States could find a way to 
continue funding the $165 billion required for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the face of a dollar 
crisis.62 Beyond the immediate crisis, the higher interest rates that would be required on new debt 
following a crisis would also constrain the nation’s ability to conduct future overseas military 
operations as it did for the British in the 1950s. Further undermining US security interests are the 
debt problems of our allies, who increasingly find themselves having to pit their domestic needs 
against the need for global security. 
The remaining national interests of prosperity, values and international order would be undermined 
by the inability of the United States to continue funding international development institutions at 
current, and less than ideal levels. One policy nested within the prosperity interest is to increase 
investments in development in order to help developing countries grow into prosperous, 
democratic, and accountable states.63 The United States’ support to international institutions such as 
the IMF and World Bank are critical ways that the nation works toward an open international 
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economic system while simultaneously promoting universal values and international cooperation. 
The United States may not be able to maintain its leadership role in these organizations following a 
dollar crisis, as it will become harder to maintain a higher level of financing relative to the other 
members. The United States could find itself reliant on the policy interests of another nation that 
may not weigh universal values, democracy, and international cooperation as highly as it does. 
The case for fiscal year 2010 is extreme based on stimulus spending, however, it is also a fact that 
the government faces. The CBO projects that annual budget deficits will fall dramatically by 2020 
behind significant increases in revenue, resulting in deficit levels equal to less than half of annual 
discretionary spending.64 These revenue increases are not guaranteed; there is ongoing debate 
regarding the expiration of the Bush tax cuts in 2012 and future growth in revenue is linked to 
economic recovery. If realized, this structure will reduce the United States’ vulnerability, but it does 




The analysis indicates a synthesis of Kennedy and Ferguson’s theories of great power decline. 
Economic foundations shift slowly over time, but the true frailty of the system is not apparent until 
a crisis tips the balance of power. Much of the United States’ current international power has been 
derived from its economic strength, and the translation of that strength into leading roles in current 
international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. However, there are indicators that this 
strength has turned into vulnerability due to excessive budget deficits financed by foreign nations 
with growingly fragile economic fundamentals.  
 Economists’ views of international currencies and the case of the interrelated declines of the sterling 
and the United Kingdom indicate that there are a number of necessary conditions that can make a 
great power vulnerable. The loss of economic prominence—as measured in terms of GDP, gross 
government debt, and trade—weakened investor confidence in the sterling, while undermining its 
utility in the trade roles of an international currency. This resulted in diversification by central banks 
and private investors who replaced a portion of their sterling reserves with dollars. This reduced the 
inflow of foreign capital to the United Kingdom, led to its inability to continue making interest 
payments on debt owed to the United States. When the United States refused additional loans to 
Britain at the outset of World War II, it forced them to sell their gold reserves and illiquid income 
producing assets. In the end, the United Kingdom had relied too heavily on deficit spending 
supported by external sources. When these sources proved unwilling to provide further support, the 
United Kingdom and the sterling gave way to the United States and the dollar. This resulted in the 
loss of international leadership, but also lost autonomy as demonstrated by the Suez Crisis. 
The United States is now following the same path as the nation’s debt has grown rapidly in the 
midst of its own wars following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. There is a long-term 
vulnerability in the trajectory of the United States’ current account deficit and growing debt burden, 
which will undermine investor confidence in the dollar as a store of value. If foreign governments 
and private investors no longer view United States securities as a safe store of value, they will begin 
to diversify their reserve holdings. This combined with the United States’ loss of its lead in world 
trade could result in the replacement of the dollar as the primary international currency. However, 
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the evidence indicates that investors still feel that the dollar is a useful investment, either as a store 
of value, or as a highly liquid asset that provides a ready means to intervene in a domestic crisis. 
Therefore, the United States has time to make necessary adjustments before the dollar loses its 
predominant role. Change will require altering federal spending priorities to restore fiscal discipline. 
However, investors holding the dollar for its high liquidity create a different vulnerability, with 
potentially more immediate consequences. 
If foreign governments are holding the dollar for its liquidity, the real danger to the United States 
international predominance may reside in the house of cards upon which its deficit spending relies. 
The largest, and fastest growing, investors in United States securities are heavily indebted 
themselves. This leaves the country vulnerable to a crisis that it cannot control. Looming crises in 
those nations could result in a run on the dollar, which would force the United States Government 
to make an immediate budgetary decision between national security and other spending. Defense 
cuts would undermine national security objectives as stated in the 2010 National Security Strategy 
and constrain ongoing overseas military operations and the nation’s leadership role in international 
institutions. A dollar crisis could also result in the dollar’s loss of status as the leading international 
currency, which poses long-term implications to national security, as the US would lose a measure of 
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